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ABSTRACT
ESSAYS IN POLITICAL ECONOMY OF DEVELOPMENT
Laurence Anthony L. Go
Shing-Yi Wang
The study of political dynasties emerged from the seminal work by Dal Bo et al.
(2009). Since then, the literature has focused on showing how incumbency advantage gave rise to political dynasties due to access to resources, name recognition and
social networks. Political dynasties were shown to be prevalent worldwide: in North
America, Latin America, Europe and Asia. However, the focus has been on classical
dynasties that persist through time. My dissertation contributes to the extant literature by studying dynastic structure in greater depth. I introduce the concept of
horizontal dynasties, where family members occupy different political offices at the
same time. By studying a different structure that dynasties take, I deepen our understanding and unpack the black box of how dynasties function. In the first chapter, I
study the impact of horizontal dynasties on local government spending and suggest
that this type of structure gives rise to more spending due to better coordination
among political actors. In the second chapter, I study dynastic persistence in settings
where rank effects are present and show that dynasties trade-off using public information with following family norms of hierarchy and patriarchy to maintain their
stability and persistence in politics. Ultimately, this dissertation shows how these
informal structures rely on informal norms in order to persist in politics. Dynastic
formation is a strategic response to circumvent formal rules and organizations in order
to maximize dynastic welfare and perpetuate these informal institutions.
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When Running for Office Runs in the Family:
Horizontal Dynasties, Policy and Development in the
Philippines∗
Dean Dulay
Duke University

Laurence Go
University of Pennsylvania

Abstract
Political dynasties exist in practically every variant of democracy. Yet the
literature has focused mostly on vertical dynasties that exist across time. We
argue that horizontal dynasties—multiple members from a family holding different political offices concurrently—lead to differential policy outcomes versus
non-horizontal dynasties. In our context this means higher levels of government spending. Horizontal dynasties increase spending by replacing potential
political opponents who may oppose policy with members of the family. But
in a developing country context, policy change may not lead to higher levels
of economic development. We test this argument’s implications in the Philippines. Employing a close elections regression discontinuity design on a sample
of mayors, we show that (i) horizontally dynastic mayors have higher levels
of government spending, (ii) increasing local government spending is driven
by preference alignment, and (iii) horizontally dynastic mayors do not lead to
greater economic wealth or lower poverty.

Key Words: Political Dynasties; Economic Policy; Preference Alignment; Political
Parties; Regression Discontinuity Design; The Philippines
∗
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1

Introduction

Political dynasties exist all over the world, from developing countries in Asia and
Africa to industrialized Western democracies like Sweden and the United States. As
a result, a growing literature has examined the ways that dynasties perpetuate themselves through the incumbency advantage (Chhibber, 2013; Feinstein, 2011; Fiva and
Smith, 2018; Querubin, 2016; Van Coppenolle, 2017) and the implications of dynastic politics on political, economic and social outcomes (Asako et al., 2015; Braganca
et al., 2015). The majority of this literature examines family relationships across
time—what we call vertical dynasties. Yet intertemporal linkages between family
members are clearly not the only type of family linkage. Horizontal dynasties—
family members holding multiple political offices concurrently—and the outcomes
that accrue to horizontal dynastic status are still relatively unexplored.
It is important to study horizontal dynasties because the arguments underlying
the formation and impacts of vertical dynasties do not necessarily translate to horizontal dynastic status. For example, horizontal dynasties cannot make use of the
incumbency advantage, which by definition requires a temporal dimension. Moreover, horizontal dynasties may access mechanisms that vertical dynasties cannot. In
particular, if politicians from the same family hold different offices concurrently they
can coordinate to implement joint policy goals. Horizontal dynasties thus operate
via distinct mechanisms and may lead to different outcomes. This paper answers the
following question: How do horizontal dynasties affect economic outcomes and what
is the mechanism that allows them to do so?
We argue that horizontal political dynasties allow politicians to more easily enact
policy by replacing potential political rivals in other offices with a member of the
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same family, thus rendering conventional constraints on policy-making, such as veto
power, ineffective. The mechanism underpinning how horizontal dynasties impact
policy is the preference alignment between members of the same family. Having
more than one member of the same family in political office concurrently allows
them to work together to achieve their policy goals. However, policy change does not
necessarily imply improvements in economic development. In contexts of low electoral
accountability and where clientelism and other non-programmatic policies determine
electoral success, the policy changes that accrue to horizontal dynastic status do not
lead to higher levels of economic development, implying that policy change may have
simply facilitated rent-seeking.
The predictions of this argument guide our empirical analysis. We study the
Philippines over the past 20 years, an ideal setting for several reasons. First, horizontal dynasties are present at multiple levels of local government: 15% of all municipal
mayors and 45% of all provincial governors are horizontally dynastic. Second, because
several existing papers on dynastic incumbency advantage and the socioeconomic effects of dynastic status are set in the Philippines (Querubin, 2016; Labonne et al.,
2017), our research directly extends and provides channels beyond the incumbency
advantage by which dynasties affect Philippine politics.
This paper focuses on Philippine municipal mayors. We identify a mayor as horizontally dynastic if he has a relative who is concurrently serving in a local executive
or legislative position within the province the mayor is a part of: the governor or
vice governor of the province, the congressman of the district, or mayors and vice
mayors in the same province. We choose to focus on mayors because they are the
primary decision-makers in setting and executing policy in the municipality. On the
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other hand, these other local positions influence the mayor’s capacity to set policy.
Most changes along local policy dimensions can be attributed to the preferences and
incentives of the local mayor. We also choose mayors for statistical reasons. There
are over 1,500 mayors serving concurrently in any given year. The large number of
mayors gives us enough sample size for identification.
Testing such predictions could be undermined by the endogeneity of horizontal
dynastic status. The presence of horizontal dynasties may be both a cause or a consequence of the policy decisions of the mayor. A third factor, such as local economic
and political conditions, may also bring about dynasties and policy change. To overcome such difficulties, our identification strategy employs a regression discontinuity
design that exploits close elections of mayors’ relatives to account for the presence of
a horizontal dynasty. Using the ruling mayor as the reference politician, we consider
a relative who runs for another political office (the vice mayor, mayor, vice governor, governor or congressman within the same province). If his relative barely wins,
the mayor is considered as having dynastic status, because two of them are in office
concurrently. We exploit close elections as a quasi-experiment that randomly assigns
whether the mayor belongs to a dynasty (when a relative barely wins an election)
or non-horizontal dynasty (when a relative barely loses an election). Following the
dynastic incumbency literature, we use close elections as our exogenous variation.
Our empirical results are consistent with the predictions of our argument. We
use government spending as our measure of policy change, and find that horizontal
dynasties spend 4-5% more than non-horizontal dynasties. This result is robust to
different functional forms of the running variable and to various optimal bandwidth
selection methods. Next, we show that preference alignment is the mechanism behind
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higher spending. We proxy the underlying alignment of preferences by examining a
reasonable outcome of misaligned preferences—conflict over the same political office.
We examine a particular dyadic pair where the potential for conflict is likely—the
mayor and the vice mayor. Mayors and vice mayors from the same family are 43-57%
less likely to conflict over political office than if the mayor and the vice mayor are not
from the same family. The argument implies that in settings, like the Philippines,
where clientelism and rent-seeking are prevalent, the policy change that accrues to
horizontal dynastic status does not lead to development. We see no relationship
between horizontal dynastic status and log night light luminosity (a proxy for wealth)
and poverty rates. Finally, we show that these results are not driven by alternative
explanations, such as dynasties serving as a proxy for political parties, connections
at the national level, or the resource base of the dynasty.
This paper extends and deepens scholarship on political dynasties. The recent
boom in research on political dynasties has thus far focused on dynastic selection,
most particularly the dynastic incumbency advantage—holding political office has a
causal effect on the probability of having future relatives in office (Querubin, 2016;
Fiva and Smith, 2018 Van Coppenolle 2017)—or on the social and economic outcomes that accrue from dynastic status (Folke et al., 2017; Geys and Smith, 2017).
This paper complements the existing literature by focusing on horizontal dynasties
and linking this particular dynastic structure with economic outcomes such as government spending and economic growth, and arguing for preference alignment as the
mechanism that mediates dynastic structure with policy.
Our work complements research by Chhibber (2013) and Smith (2018) which argue for a relationship between party organization and dynastic political selection. We
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claim that political dynasties function to coordinate political activities and mitigate
political conflict—what formal organizations political parties are supposed to accomplish. Informal political structures such as horizontal dynasties may thus augment
the functions of formal organizations like parties (Brollo and Nannicini, 2012; Fiva
and Halse, 2016; Fouirnaies and Mutlu-Eren, 2015; Solé-Ollé and Sorribas-Navarro,
2008). More broadly, our paper speaks to a large literature on how kinship networks
and personal relationships influence political and economic outcomes (Cruz et al.,
2017; Fisman, 2001; Ferguson and Voth, 2008).

2

Horizontal Dynasties: Policy, Preferences and
Development

In this section we propose a simple argument that links horizontal dynastic status
with policy and development outcomes. The argument is set-up as follows: Consider a
reference politician, which we call the mayor.1 Mayors set and execute policy in their
municipality. Mayors attempt to win elections and extract rents. In principle, they
may use a variety of tools to achieve these goals. Here, we focus on policymaking. For
example, a policy like building a road may benefit a mayor’s constituents and win their
votes, or otherwise be a conduit for the mayor’s own enrichment. Regardless of the
mayor’s underlying goals, they face constraints in the form of other rival politicians.
These rival politicians wield institutional tools, such as the ability to veto a mayor’s
policy, that will prevent the mayor from enacting their preferred policies. Mayors
therefore need to find a way to circumvent these constraints in order to achieve their
1

The argument extends to any politician who has control over the setting and execution of policy.

7

political objectives.
Horizontal dynastic linkages allow mayors to circumvent these constraints from
rival politicians by replacing a would-be rival with a member of their family. Consider
the following simple scenario: A mayor wants to build a road but is vetoed by a rival
politician. The road does not get built. The alternative scenario is one where the rival
is replaced by a member of the mayor’s family. Consider again the same road-building
project. The mayor proposes the project. But now, with the family member in place
of the rival, the road is now built. Extending this logic to policy more broadly, we
can say that horizontally dynastic mayors will implement differential policy versus
non-horizontally dynastic mayors.
The mechanism underlying the policy differences between horizontally and nonhorizontally dynastic mayors is preference alignment. We argue that politicians from
the same family have aligned political goals, and hence work together to achieve
them. This mechanism mirrors arguments of the role of parties and coalitions in
aligning preferences between politicians and thus making policies easier to implement
(Tsebelis, 1995; Treisman, 2000). In particular, we follow the logic of Cox and McCubbins (2001), who argue that “sameness of purpose”—in other words preference
alignment—may allow politicians to circumvent institutional constraints without removing the constraint itself. Note that while preference alignment is difficult to test,
the argument implies that aligned preferences will lead to reduced conflict across political offices. Politicians work together via access to multiple offices rather than fight
over a particular position.
While horizontal dynasties differentially affect policy, it is unclear whether these
policy differences imply improvements in welfare and development. On the one hand,
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studies have argued that policy may be used as a way to generate kickbacks for corrupt politicians (Boas et al., 2014; Rose-Ackerman and Palifka, 2016). If this is the
case, then horizontal dynasties further facilitate rent-seeking because they eliminate
potential checks on corrupt politicians. On the other hand, policy may be welfare
enhancing and politicians hoping to enact such policies do so in the hopes of maintaining political office (Ashworth, 2012; De Mesquita et al., 2005; Lake and Baum,
2001). In this sense, horizontal dynasties facilitate development because they are able
to circumvent the inefficiencies inherent to checks and balances in order to provide
citizens with policies they desire.
In the context of the Philippines we expect the former case to accrue. Horizontal
dynasties do not lead to development. First, the Philippines lacks electoral accountability (Hutchcroft, 2000; Quimpo, 2007). In the absence of accountability channels
winning elections does not hinge on public service provision and instead becomes a
matter of facilitating clientelistic political exchange (Cruz, 2019; Cruz et al., 2017).
Furthermore, the Philippines has a weak bureaucracy and low state capacity. Even if
spending were ostensibly to be used for welfare-enhancing purposes, the quality of the
output may be low and spending may be inefficient. Our argument is consistent with
an empirical literature that claims that in places with poor governance, government
spending is not correlated with improved development outcomes (Devarajan et al.,
1996; Rajkumar and Swaroop, 2008).
The argument yields three testable hypotheses:

Hypothesis 1: Horizontal Dynasties and Policy Outcomes
Horizontally dynastic mayors enact differential policy than non-horizontally dy-
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nastic mayors.

Hypothesis 2: Horizontal Dynasties and Preference Alignment
Horizontal dynastic status between two offices (such as the mayor and a vice
mayor) with potential political conflict over each other leads to preference alignment
and less conflict over political office than non-horizontally dynastic status between
two offices.

Hypothesis 3: Horizontal Dynasties and Economic Development
Municipalities with horizontally dynastic mayors do not lead to higher levels of
economic development than municipalities with non-horizontally dynastic mayors.

At the outset, we acknowledge limiting conditions for our argument. The argument
likely does not apply to horizontal dynasties that are powerful enough to completely
override the political system. These horizontal dynasties do not need to work within
(and hence attempt to circumvent) checks and balances. Perhaps a more appropriate model for these “strong” dynasties is warlord governance (Mukhopadhyay, 2014)
or the Mafia (Gambetta, 1996). Furthermore, the argument likely does not hold in
countries with stable party systems. In these countries, parties already facilitate the
role of coordination and preference alignment between members of the party organization (Aldrich, 1995). This implies that horizontal dynasties may be an institutional
solution to the problem of weak, unstable party alignments that plague countries like
the Philippines (Hicken, 2009).
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3

The Philippines: Background and Institutional
Context

This paper focuses on mayors in the context of the post-Marcos Philippines, spanning
the early 1990s to the present. We focus on mayors for specific reasons: first, mayors
are considered the central actor in local politics, close enough to the people to be
accountable to their needs while having substantive relationships with other local officials within the municipality, across municipalities, and with other branches of local
government. Second, mayors also face constraints (or opportunities for coordination) from other local politicians. Moreover, we show through the extant qualitative
research and semi-structured elite interviews that many of the elements of our argument, such as the role of various sorts of political conflict as constraints and the
benefits of mayors coordinating with other local offices fit neatly into the Philippine
context.

3.1

Local Political Structure

Mayors are the head of the executive branch of a Philippine city or municipality, the
backbone of local politics in the Philippines. The difference between when a locality is
defined as a city or a municipality is a function of land area and population size, with
larger and more populous municipalities garnering more transfers from the national
government.2 Mayors preside over a variety of executive functions at the local level,
and the extent of their control ranges from the exercise of general supervision over all
projects and programs at the city level, initiating and maximizing the generation of
2

The primary distinction between cities and municipalities are income and population size. For
this study the terms are used interchangeably.
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Figure 1 Political Structure in the Philippines

revenue, and ensuring the delivery of basic services (Local Government Code (LGC)
Section 455). As a branch of the executive, mayors are tasked with enforcing local laws
or ordinances that are created through a city legislature, composed of the municipal
board.
Research has identified mayors, their incentives and their behaviors as among the
major drivers of local Philippine politics. In his study of local politics in Cavite,
Sidel (1999) argues that the position of mayor is a major prize, the benefits associated with it being “the awarding of building permits, the passage of municipal zoning
ordinances, the use of government-owned land, the allocation of public works, the approval of reclamation projects.....[and] the awarding of petty monopoly franchises and
concessions” (p.33).
Mayors operate within a larger infrastructure of local politics (see Figure 1). First,
vice mayors assist the mayors in implementing policy at the municipality level. They
also serve as the presiding officer of the municipal board, which has veto power over
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the mayor’s policies. Cities and municipalities make up one of 81 provinces, the most
aggregated level of local government in the Philippines. The executive branch of a
province is headed by a governor and vice governor, who attain office through plurality elections. Although the political responsibilities of governors and vice governors
are similar in each jurisdiction, the provinces themselves vary widely in terms of measures such as levels of economic development. Multiple cities and municipalities also
comprise a legislative jurisdiction called a district. Districts are headed by congressmen, who are in charge of representing their district in the House of Representatives,
which is in turn responsible for drafting national legislation.3
For this paper, mayors will be considered horizontally dynastic if they are related
to any of the positions expounded on above—the vice mayor of the municipality, the
governor and vice governor of the province, the congressman of the district—as well as
other mayors within the same province. These positions are all elected concurrently
every three years. Each position faces a term limit of three consecutive terms. The
concurrent structure of local politics naturally lends itself to the horizontal dynastic
structure. Finally, voters in the Philippines vote for individuals and not parties. It
is therefore possible that a voter votes for a mayor and another local politician (such
as the vice mayor or the governor) from opposing parties.

3.2

Political Dynasties in the Philippines

Political dynasties—a collection of family members occupying political office either
concurrently or through time—are the core unit of local political organization, existing
alongside and embedded within formal institutions such as political parties (Fegan,
3

Appendix A describes in greater depth how these different positions relate to the mayor.
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1993).4 Prominent political analysts have noted that dynasties are an organizational
expression of the century-long dominance of local governments by local elites. Political
clans “are an enduring feature of Philippine politics”, and have “displayed an uncanny
ability to adapt to the changing landscape of Philippine politics” (Coronel, 2004). That
is, while Philippine politics features the formal rules and institutions that usually
accompany democratic governments, these rules and institutions are underpinned by
informal structures, in this case the political family (McCoy, 2009).

3.3

Qualitative Support

Semi-structured elite interviews of local politicians conducted in the Philippines and
the extant literature provide suggestive evidence that supports the argument. One
mayor we interviewed said that conflict over politics “may lead to the project just
being scrapped. Even if there is an approved appropriation, if the governor does not
sign the papers, it will just never get done”.5 Another mayor echoes this sentiment:
“I am in conflict with the governor because I allied with his opponent. I cannot get
projects from him...No funds for events. Funding goes to political allies”.6 Another
mayor interviewee provides an example of how vice mayors may facilitate projects. If
the vice mayor is a political ally, then they could “fast track the projects or proposal of
the local chief executive, [and] serve a bridge between the mayor and the councilors”.7
Conversely, if the vice mayor is an opponent, he may use leverage as head of the
4

It is again worth stressing that parties continue to be relegated to the sidelines of Philippine
politics. Apart from parties having no significant ideological or political differences, politics has been
candidate-based and personality-driven instead of party-driven (Manacsa and Tan, 2005; Querubin,
2016).
5
Interview with a mayor, February 2019.
6
Interview with a mayor, February 2019.
7
Interview with a mayor, February 2019
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council, as well as his own veto power, to stifle the mayor’s policy.
The extant qualitative literature on the Philippines further supports the mechanism that it is preference alignment between family members that drives policy
change. Coronel (2004) identifies the family as the core political organization through
which coalitionist goals are achieved: “The family...became the main instrument for
contesting elections, expanding political power, and amassing wealth. The kinship network that makes up the clans became the core political organization”. Beckett (1993)
also emphasizes the natural tendency towards preference alignment among families,
while acknowledging their occasional fragmentation: “while a family may be divided
momentarily, the norms and sentiments that define it transcend particularities...the
anger is forgotten, siblings reconciled, and families reunited”. Most telling may be
the stated opinions of dynastic politicians themselves. When Ramon Durano, former
mayor of Danao City, was questioned by foreign journalists about family members in
local office, he replied: “politics is not something you can entrust to non-relatives”
(Cullinane, 1993).

4
4.1

Data and Descriptive Statistics
Sample Construction

The paper focuses on mayors’ relationships with the following positions: vice mayors,
governors, vice governors, congressmen, and mayors from other municipalities. A
horizontal dynasty is identified when the mayor and the politician from any one of
these positions is from the same family concurrently. We obtain elections data for
these positions from the Commission on Elections from 1988 until 2013. During this
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period, there were 74 to 80 provinces, 200 to 234 districts and 1,610 to 1,634 cities
and municipalities in the Philippines. All local elections are held simultaneously every
three years, and all local positions have a three-term limit. The initial sample includes
625 governors and vice governors, 1691 congresspersons, and 12,891 mayors and vice
mayors, totaling 28,723 local officials across 8 election years.
From the initial sample of 12,891 mayors, we focus on those mayors with exactly one relative running for office at the same election year, leaving us with 1,962
observations in the final sample.8
This sample is then split into the treatment group or horizontal dynasties (mayors whose relative barely won the other local position), and control group or nonhorizontal dynasties (mayors whose relative barely lost the other local position). Table 1 breaks down the final sample into winning (and hence horizontally dynastic)
and losing (non-horizontally dynastic) relatives, by position. There are 966 mayors in
the treatment group and 996 mayors in the control group. Overall, the total number
of horizontal dynasties across treatment and control groups as well as for each local
position is relatively balanced.
Table 2 compares the initial and final samples to see how our chosen sample differs
from the universe of mayors in the Philippines. We find that municipalities in the final
sample have a larger population, although they are less urban. Reassuringly, both
samples do not differ in most other demographic, economic and political variables:
spending per capita, land area, mayor’s term, number of candidates, voter turnout
and party affiliation (i.e. alignment with president’s party).

8

The reason for focusing on mayors with exactly one relative in office simultaneously is for the
validity of our identification strategy which will be explained in detail in the subsequent section.
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Table 1 Position of Mayor’s Relatives in the Final Sample
Position
All
Governor
144
Vice Governor
101
Congressperson 320
Mayor
501
Vice Mayor
896
Total
1,962

%
7.34
5.15
16.31
25.54
45.67
100

Won
%
Lost
66
6.83
78
56
5.80
45
155 16.04 165
211 21.84 290
478 49.48 418
966
100
996

%
7.83
4.52
16.57
29.12
41.97
100

Table 2 Summary Statistics, Initial vs. Final Sample
Variable

Initial Sample

Final Sample

Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
Spending (log per capita) 7.070
0.714
7.091
0.717
Population
50,281 106,632 61,510 124,219
Land Area (hectares)
21,018
23,089
20,087
22,077
Urban
0.798
0.271
0.766
0.297
Mayor’s Term
1.617
0.740
1.631
0.744
Number of Candidates
2.897
1.504
2.850
1.508
Voter Turnout
79.610
7.768
79.480
8.154
Party Affiliation
0.340
0.474
0.324
0.468
N
12,691
1,962

Difference
0.021
11,229∗∗∗
-931
-0.032∗∗∗
0.014
-0.047
-0.130
-0.016

Note: The initial sample consists of all mayors while the final sample consists of all mayors
with exactly one relative in office at the same time. ***, ** and * denote statistical significance
at 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.

4.2

Independent Variable: Horizontal Dynasty

The key independent variable for this study is whether the mayor is horizontally
dynastic or not. Using the final sample, we define a mayor in city i at election year
t to be horizontally dynastic if he has exactly one family member occupying a local
political office within the larger province where the municipality is located in, also at
election year t. Hence the requirements for satisfying the horizontal dynasty definition
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are: (1) the mayor has exactly one relative in another office, (2) both the mayor and
his/her relative win the election, (3) both are in office at the same election year, (4)
both come from the same province, and (5) the relative occupies a local position as
defined above. For example, a winning mayor in the province of Cebu is horizontally
dynastic in 2013 if he has a relative who is also elected as the governor, vice governor,
congressperson, mayor or vice mayor in the same province in 2013. It is important
to note that this definition of dynasties is more specific than the definition taken by
other authors (Querubin, 2016).9 Because our argument focuses on the concurrency
aspect of dynastic status, limiting dynastic status to multiple family members within
a given year constitutes the most valid variable to test our argument.
In the absence of high-quality data, we identify family members by exploiting
naming traditions and matching surnames (Braganca et al., 2015; Querubin, 2016).
We follow the existing literature by identifying family networks via a matching procedure where individuals with identical surnames residing in the same province are
considered related. Online Appendix B expounds on the matching process in greater
detail and addresses potential concerns such as false matches (positive and negative)
in the data.

4.3

Dependent Variables

Hypothesis 1 states that horizontal dynastic status (politicians from the same family holding political positions simultaneously) leads to differential policy than nonhorizontal dynastic status. Our measure of policy outcome is government spending.
9

He uses two definitions: dynastic recent (if the candidate had a relative who served in the 20
years prior to the election) and dynastic incumbent (if the candidate is related to an incumbent at
the time of the election). We use a variant of the latter, where politicians from the same family are
horizontally dynastic if they are elected simultaneously.
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Furthermore, we claim that in the Philippine context, horizontally dynastic mayors
will spend more than non-horizontally dynastic mayors. The data on government
spending is at the municipal level spending obtained from the Bureau of Local Government Finance.10 We consider the three year average of a municipality’s spending
after every election. For example, for the election year 2007, we consider the dependent variable to be the municipal government spending for 2008-2010 since mayors
only have control over the budget after they assume office and budget planning starts
the year before its enactment. Finally, we use log per capita measure to ensure comparability across differently sized municipalities, to decrease the impact of outliers,
and to make the coefficients easier to interpret. Consistent with our argument, this
measure includes all the programs that benefit the mayor’s constituency—including
public and social services such as schools, hospitals, and roads, public goods such
as security, and exclusive goods such as titles, permits, and other forms of property
rights.
We choose government spending as our measure of policy outcomes for the following reasons: First, the level of government spending represents an observable measure
that politicians attempt to manipulate, and hence is often used as a policy outcome
in the literature (Alt and Lowry, 1994; Fiorina, 1996; Alesina and Rosenthal, 1995).
Second, the level of government spending is consistent with both winning votes and
extracting rents (Birdsall, 1996; Dixit and Londregan, 1996). For example, if a politician wants to win elected office, he or she may increase the level of spending on
schools and hospitals to increase welfare and hence win votes. On the other hand,
10

To be precise, our measure aggregates different categories of spending as defined by the BLGF.
They are general public services, education, culture and manpower development, health, nutrition
and population control, labor and employment, housing and community development, social services
and social welfare, debt services, and economic services.
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politicians who hope to engage in rent-seeking may also increase local government
spending, creating a bigger pie for them to pilfer from. An increase in government
spending thus captures a variety of political goals—from winning votes to stealing
resources. Finally, Philippines spending data is reliable, standardized across years,
and available for the entirety of our sample.
While we argue that in the Philippine context spending is higher for horizontally
dynastic mayors, in principle, horizontal dynasties may instead lead to a reduction
in local government spending. An alternative argument is that horizontal dynasties
solve the common pool resource problem (Weingast et al., 1981). By this logic,
two politicians both spend beyond what is socially optimal because each seeks to
provide for their constituency. Horizontal dynasties align preferences and therefore
allow both politicians (particularly the mayor) to reduce spending. The specifics
of the Philippine context do not fit this argument. First, mayors have control over
budget allocation and executing policy, and therefore control over the municipality’s
resource pool (Esguerra 2001). The implication of this arrangement is that political
rivals do not have access to the mayor’s resources. They thus constrain the mayor by
blocking policy, for example via a governor or vice mayor vetoing the mayor’s road
construction project. Second, discretionary funds are given to municipalities that
have shown that they can spend the money. Spending proxies for the municipality’s
underlying capacity. Mayors are therefore incentivized to increase spending to have
access to more funds.
Finally, the argument presumes that credit for higher government spending goes
to the mayor (and not to other politicians like the vice mayor or the governor). In the
Philippines, mayors use their ultimate control over both the budget and the execution
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of government projects to advertise claim credit. Figure 2 below shows mayors putting
their names on completed projects in order to claim credit for them.
Figure 2 Mayors and Government Projects

This Pasig City public high school is named after its longest-serving mayor. The
Eusebio dynasty has ruled Pasig City since 1992, starting from the patriarch (Vicente
Eusebio), his wife (Soledad Cruz-Eusebio), the son and incumbent (Robert Eusebio)
and the incumbent’s wife (Maribel Andaya-Eusebio). Currently, brothers Robert and
Richard Eusebio are the incumbent mayor and congressman, respectively.

Hypothesis 2 states that the preference alignment that comes with dynastic structures are the underlying drivers of increased spending. Finding an appropriate dependent variable to indicate preference alignment is difficult for a few reasons. First, conflict between political offices is difficult to measure directly. Second, different dyadic
relationships may differ in the ways that conflicts manifest themselves.11 Ideally, we
11

For example, for mayors and vice mayors, conflicts arise through the vetoing of ordinances by
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would hope to obtain a more direct measure of conflict between politicians—number
of bills passed, whether projects were delayed or canceled, and the like. Unfortunately,
this data is extremely difficult to collect at the municipal level. We instead measure
conflict by focusing on the ultimate outcome of this conflict—contests over political
office. Our dependent variable is therefore whether the vice mayor and mayor face
each other for the mayoral position in the next election. Preferences are aligned if
vice mayors do not challenge for the mayor’s office; preferences are not aligned if they
do. Challenges between the mayor and the vice mayor are the most literal and direct indicators of conflict over political office because they directly speak to divergent
preferences over who holds political power.
We acknowledge that this is an imperfect measure of preference alignment. More
direct measures, such as transcripts of meetings between the mayors and other politicians, or actual records of vetoed spending, are unavailable. Many municipalities
state that they do not have these records. While imperfect, we believe that this
measure is suggestive of underlying preference alignment and is our best effort, given
data constraints, at capturing this concept.
Hypothesis 3 states that horizontal dynasties do not lead to economic development. We operationalize the development implications of horizontal dynasties by
examining their effect on economic wealth and poverty reduction. We use the log of
night light luminosity as a proxy for economic wealth. Moreover, night time lights
have been shown to be very highly correlated with traditional measures such as GDP
(Henderson et al., 2012; Elvidge et al., 2001), and especially advantageous for measurthe municipal board, whereas for the governor and the mayor, conflict may manifest itself through
governors using their supervisory powers over the mayors in their province to stifle the mayor’s
policy changes.
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ing output at the lowest levels of development (Chen and Nordhaus, 2011; Pierskalla
et al., 2017). This paper employs night lights data from the Defense Meteorological
Satellite Program’s Operational Linescan System. Luminosity intensity scores are
scaled from 0-63 for each square kilometer. The unweighted average of each 1 km ×
1 km grid cell within the boundaries of the municipality is calculated to obtain a luminosity score for each municipality. This average then becomes the luminosity score
for a given municipality. We take the night lights data two years after every election
as the outcome variable. We also use municipal poverty rates as a second measure
of economic development. We obtained the small-area poverty estimates from the
Philippine Statistics Authority, which is based on the triennial Family Income and
Expenditures Survey from 2000 to 2013. For consistency with the night lights measure, we assign the poverty rate two years after every election as the corresponding
outcome variable.
It is worth noting that both night light luminosity and poverty rates are not
perfect proxies for development. First, there may be a lag between policy, in terms
of spending, and development, in terms of luminosity and poverty reduction. The
developmental benefits that accrue from spending may bear fruit beyond the first few
years of a mayor’s term. We choose not to test longer-term economic development
because this leads to an identification problem—it is not clear to which mayor do
we credit long-term development. Second, economic development is a multifaceted
concept, and our measures may not fully capture the potential ways spending may
affect it. Still, we believe that the evidence provided above is suggestive of our
argument that horizontal dynasties do not lead to development.

23

5

Identification Strategy

5.1

Testing H1: Horizontal Dynasties and Spending

We first test whether horizontal dynasties spend more than non-horizontal dynasties.
In order to test this, the ideal experiment would be to randomly assign dynastic
status to two otherwise similar groups (one is horizontal, while the other is nonhorizontal) and observe consequent differences in spending. While this is impossible
to experimentally manipulate, using regression discontinuity designs closely mimic
this experimental scenario. By definition, a mayor achieves horizontally dynastic
status when he has a relative occupying another political office within the province
during the same election term. Randomly assigning whether a mayor’s relative wins
or loses is therefore synonymous to randomly giving horizontally dynastic status to
that particular mayor. Consistent with previous literature, close elections serve as
a quasi-experimental setting where a candidate (i.e. the mayor’s relative) is deemed
to win or lose at random. Hence, comparing mayors whose relative barely wins
(and therefore achieve horizontally dynastic status) with those whose relative barely
loses (and therefore do not achieve horizontally dynastic status) allows us to causally
identify the effect of horizontal dynasties on local government spending.12
For testing this hypothesis, the treatment group consists of mayors who have
relatives simultaneously elected for any of the following positions: the provincial
governor or vice governor, another mayor or vice mayor in the same province, or
12

In order to properly implement this design, we limit our sample to mayors with exactly one other
relative running for local office. Including mayors with two or more relatives invalidates our design
since now we need to consider more than one election for the RD. This introduces the problem of
reducing the multidimensional margin variable (one for each family member) to a unidimensional
margin variable, or the issue of choosing which election to include in the RD analysis. In the data,
74% of horizontal dynasties are composed of two member dynasties.
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the congressman of the district. The control group then includes mayors who have
relatives who failed to get elected (in the same year) for any of the above local
positions.13
Following the standard RDD specification, we exploit close elections to test our
first hypothesis:

Spendingit = α + βHorizontalDynastyit + f (M Vit ) + g(M Vit , HDit ) + δi + τt + it
∀i s.t. M Vit ∈ [−h, h]
where Spendingit is (log) government spending per capita in municipality i and
year t, HorizontalDynastyit is a dummy variable equal to one if a mayor’s relative
wins at year t, f (·) and g(·) are linear and quadratic functions of M Vit , the relative’s
vote margin, as well as the interaction with the HorizontalDynastyit dummy, and δi
and τt are municipality and year fixed effects. We cluster standard errors by province
to account for the fact that naming dynasties aggregates at the provincial level. The
coefficient of interest β therefore measures the treatment effect of horizontal dynasties
on municipal spending.14
Figure 3 presents suggestive evidence of the effects of horizontal dynastic status on
spending. We see a discontinuous jump in spending around the cutoff, which implies
that winning and hence gaining horizontal dynastic status leads to greater spending.
Table 3 presents the regression results using the full sample with parametric control functions in Columns 1-6, and the limited sample using optimal bandwidth selec13

Note that we do not make a distinction between first-term mayors and those who have previous
political experience. We examine whether experience is driving the results in a later section.
14
Given how we operationalize horizontal dynasties, our design can only compare horizontal dynasties with two members with non-horizontal dynasties. In a sense, we can only speak to the
‘extensive margin’ effect of horizontal dynasties instead of the ‘intensive margin’, which explores the
difference between two-member and n-member dynasties (where n > 2).
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Figure 3 Municipal Spending and Relative’s Vote
Margin
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Note: Horizontal axis shows the vote margin of the mayor’s relative running for another local office,
where a positive vote margin implies horizontal dynastic status. Each circle is the average local
government spending per capita (log) within 0.05 intervals of the vote margin. Solid lines are
smoothed local polynomials on either side of the discontinuity. The shaded gray areas are the 95%
confidence intervals.

tion procedures proposed in the literature (Imbens and Kalyanaraman, 2012; Calonico
et al., 2014) in Columns 7-10. Odd-numbered columns are models without fixed effects, while even-numbered columns include both municipality and year fixed effects
to control for potential time- and place-invariant factors.
In all specifications, we see that having another relative in government leads mayors to spend more on their respective municipalities. In our preferred specifications
with fixed effects, municipalities led by dynastic mayors spend 4-5% more than their
non-dynastic counterparts. These estimates are statistically significant and economically meaningful. They are equivalent to the municipality’s average spending on
education and housing. The positive and statistically significant relationship is ro-
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bust to the inclusion of fixed effects and to various functional forms of the winning
margin. However, coefficients from specifications with fixed effects differ from those
without fixed effects. As expected, fixed effects models obtain more muted coefficients
since comparisons are done within municipalities (and so variation from very different
municipalities—in terms of size and spending—are removed).15
We then address the identifying assumptions of the RD. We test for balance on
a number of predetermined variables that may cause discontinuities in spending. We
find that covariate means are balanced around the cutoff (see Figures C2 and C1).
Next, we check for potential manipulation using the McCrary (2008) test and find
no evidence of manipulation (see Figure 4). Finally, for robustness, we show that
coefficient estimates are stable for a wide range of bandwidths (see Figure 5).

5.2

Testing H2: Horizontal Dynasties and Preference Alignment

We now empirically test for preference alignment across political offices for horizontal
and non-horizontal dynasties. Institutionally, the natural progression in political
ranks is most commonly observed among vice mayors vying to become mayors. Given
our focus on municipal-level analysis, we consider only mayor and vice mayor (MVM)
pairs because this provides us with (i) a clear test of preference alignment, as mayors
and vice mayors often engage in political conflict over the office of the mayor16 , (ii) a
15

Although the estimates vary across specifications, it must be noted that coefficients are stable
conditional on including fixed effects. In evaluating robustness to omitted variable bias, Oster (2017)
notes that “coefficient stability on its own is at best uninformative and at worst very misleading. It
must be combined with information about R-squared movements.” Using her robustness estimator,
we find that the movements of our β and R2 suggest that our results are robust to omitted variable
bias.
16
The emphasis on this particular dyadic pair stems from the need to capture the type of political
conflict that best embodies our argument. For example, gubernatorial contests between incumbent

None
1
.032
1,943

0.0792∗∗
(0.0363)
7.09
-0.00630
(0.0169)
7.09
×
×
None
1
.878
1,943

0.0527∗∗∗
(0.0162)

0.0885∗
(0.0450)

Linear
1
.047
1,943

-0.00466
(0.0174)
7.09
×
×
Linear
1
.878
1,943

0.0521∗∗∗
(0.0157)

0.0982∗∗
(0.0451)

0.0562
(0.0375)
7.09

(4)

(3)

Quadratic
1
.0461
1,943

0.0558
(0.0381)
7.09

0.0770
(0.0590)

0.0792
(0.0588)

(5)

-0.00353
(0.0177)
7.09
×
×
Quadratic
1
.879
1,943

0.0517∗∗
(0.0226)

0.0515∗∗
(0.0226)

(6)

0.0447∗∗
(0.0195)

0.0427∗∗
(0.0187)

(8)

0.134∗∗∗
(0.0434)

0.132∗∗∗
(0.0419)

(9)

-0.0165
-0.0114
(0.0282) (0.0463)
7.05
7.05
×
×
None
None
None
CCT=.2 CCT=.2 IK=.21
.00815
.866
.00763
924
924
962

-0.0187
(0.0475)
7.05

0.140∗∗∗
(0.0441)

0.137∗∗∗
(0.0428)

(7)

Optimal Bandwidth

-0.0191
(0.0272)
7.05
×
×
None
IK=.21
.871
962

0.0454∗∗
(0.0202)

0.0430∗∗
(0.0193)

(10)

Note: Robust standard errors clustered at the province level are in parentheses. Dependent variable is log spending
per capita in a municipality or city. Horizontal dynasty is a dummy that takes the value 1 (0) if the mayor’s relative
wins (loses) the election.

Dep Var Mean
Municipal FE
Year FE
Function
Bandwidth
Adj. R2
N

Same Party

(1)
(2)
Panel A: Basic Specification
Horizontal Dynasty 0.259∗∗∗ 0.0426∗∗∗
(0.0385) (0.0145)
Panel B: Control for Same Party
Horizontal Dynasty 0.230∗∗∗ 0.0443∗∗∗
(0.0391) (0.0161)

Full Sample

Table 3 Horizontal Dynasties and Spending
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Note: The figure shows the McCrary (2008) test for discontinuity in the density of observations
around the vote margin threshold. The formal test cannot reject the null of a continuous density around the cutoff, where the magnitude of the discontinuity is very close to zero and is not
statistically significant (p-value = 0.782).
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Figure 5 Robustness to Alternative Bandwidths (H1)
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Note: Each sub-figure plots the point estimates for different bandwidth values between 0.10 and
1 in 0.01 increments. In Panel A, the coefficients are estimates based on the specification with
municipality and year fixed effects. In Panel B, the coefficients are based on the specification
without fixed effects. Thin lines stemming from the point estimates show 95% confidence intervals
while the slightly thicker lines show 90% confidence intervals. Estimates shown in blue are for the
optimal bandwidth proposed by Calonico et al. (2014) (h = 0.20) while the estimates shown in red
are for the optimal bandwidth proposed by Imbens and Kalyanaraman (2012) (h = 0.21)
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larger sample size to test this hypothesis17 , and (iii) methods and analyses consistent
with those in the previous subsection.
In this case, the ideal experiment is to randomly assign MVM pairs that belong
to the same or different families to similar municipalities and observe whether this
affects the likelihood that a vice mayor challenges the mayor in the succeeding election.
Electing a MVM who both belong to one family is largely an endogenous process.
For example, municipalities that have political leaders who are related to each other
might be a result of uncompetitive elections which in turn lead to less conflict in
political office. Again, using relatives’ close elections skirts around this endogeneity
issue. Because the dependent variable is the likelihood that the vice mayor runs for
mayor in the next election, we use the vice mayor as the reference politician. We
compare vice mayors whose relatives barely win mayoral elections (making the MVM
pair come from the same family) with those whose relatives barely lose (making the
MVM pair come from different families) and examine the effect on the vice mayor’s
decision to run for mayor in the succeeding election.
For this test, we only consider the sample of vice mayors with relatives simultaneously running for mayor. Among those with mayoral relatives, we only include
mayors who are not term-limited and run again for mayor. Limiting our sample to
these 246 vice mayors assures us that there is real conflict between the mayor and
vice mayor. The treatment group consists of vice mayors who have relatives simultamayors and governors are a much more selected sample from the pool of electoral challenges. When a
municipal mayor challenges the provincial governor, this is a signal that the mayor has high ‘politician
quality’, broadly defined, and therefore is not representative of the conflict we are interested in.
The same is true for electoral contests between mayors and congresspersons, and mayors and vice
governors.
17
Among horizontal dynasties that have exactly two members (one of which is the incumbent
mayor), 46% are MVM pairs.
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neously elected for mayor in the same municipality while the control group includes
vice mayors who have relatives running for mayor who failed to get elected in the
same year.
As in the previous section, we exploit close elections to test our second hypothesis:

RunM ayorit+1 = α + βSameF amilyit + f (M Vit ) + g(M Vit , SFit ) + δi + τt + it
∀i s.t. SameF amilyit ∈ [−h, h]
where RunM ayorit+1 is an indicator for whether the incumbent vice mayor i
runs for mayor in election year t + 1, SameF amilyit is a dummy variable equal to
one if a vice mayor’s relative wins in election year t, f (·) and g(·) are linear and
quadratic functions of the relative’s vote margin, as well as the interaction with the
SameF amilyit dummy, and δi and τt are municipality and year fixed effects. Standard
errors are clustered at the province level as before. The coefficient of interest β is
the treatment effect of the mayor and vice mayor being in the same family on the
probability of political challenge between the two positions.
Figure 6 shows the decreased likelihood of political challenge when the MVM come
from the same family. Due to limited sample size, the points are quite noisy although
there is evidence of a discontinuity around the cutoff.
Table 4 shows that having a MVM pair come from the same family decreases
the probability of political challenge (see Panel A). Estimates imply an economically
significant impact of family similarity on decreased political conflict.18 To make sense
of the coefficients, if we assume that all non-horizontal dynasties become horizontal
18

As before, results are relatively stable conditional on including or excluding fixed effects. Using
the Oster (2017) bounding estimator, we find that our results are fairly stable and robust to the
presence of omitted variable bias.
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Note: Robust standard errors clustered at the province level are in parentheses. Dependent variable is the incumbent vice mayor’s probability of running for mayor in the next election. Same family is a dummy that takes the
value 1 (0) if the vice mayor’s relative wins (loses) the mayoral election.
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Table 4 Horizontal Dynasties and Preference Alignment Across Political Office
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Figure 6 Running for Mayor and Family Similarity
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Note: Horizontal axis shows the vote margin of the vice mayor’s relative running for mayor, where a
positive vote margin implies that the mayor and vice mayor pair belongs to the same family. Each
circle is the vice mayor’s average probability of running for mayor within 0.05 intervals of the vote
margin. Solid lines are smoothed local polynomials on either side of the discontinuity. The shaded
gray areas are the 95% confidence intervals.

dynasties (52% of the sample), then we see a 22 to 29% decrease in the probability of challenging the incumbent, reversing the baseline probability of running for
non-horizontal dynasties. Simply put, the coefficients are significantly large to deter
political challenge when competitors belong to the same family. In sum, the empirical results support our hypothesis. Preference alignment tends to be greater between
members of the same political dynasty.
We then check if the identifying assumptions hold. First, we check for manipulation using the McCrary (2008) test and find no evidence of manipulation (see Figure
C4). Second, we test for balance on several predetermined variables and find that
covariate means are balanced around the cutoff (see Figure C3). Finally, as an additional robustness test, we show that coefficient estimates are stable for a wide range
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of bandwidths (see Figure C5).

5.3

Testing H3: Horizontal Dynasties and Economic Development

We now empirically test the relationship between horizontal dynasties and economic
development. The argument posits that in the context of the Philippines—rampant
rent-seeking, vote-buying, and clientelism—higher government spending associated
with horizontal dynasties does not lead to higher levels of development. Similar to
Hypothesis 1, the treatment group (horizontal dynasties) consists of mayors who
have relatives simultaneously elected for any of the following positions: the provincial
governor or vice governor, another mayor or vice mayor in the same province, or
the congressman of the district. The control group then includes mayors who have
relatives who failed to get elected (in the same year) for any of the above local
positions.
Similar to our previous regressions, we estimate the following model but with the
development outcomes as our dependent variable:

Developmentit = α + βHDit + f (M Vit ) + g(M Vit , HDit ) + δi + τt + it
∀i s.t. M Vit ∈ [−h, h]
where Developmentit is either the poverty incidence or (log) night lights in municipality i and year t, HDit is a dummy variable equal to one if a mayor’s relative
wins at year t, f (·) and g(·) are linear and quadratic functions of M Vit , the relative’s
vote margin, as well as the interaction with the HDit dummy, and δi and τt are mu-
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nicipality and year fixed effects. We cluster standard errors by province to account
for the fact that naming dynasties aggregates at the provincial level.
The results from Table 5 show that horizontal dynasties do not lead to greater
economic wealth. Columns 1 to 10 mirror the specifications from Tables 3 and 4.
The point estimates are very small and noisy, but suggest that the increased government spending does not lead to policies and projects that are conducive to wealth
accumulation. Similar to the previous specifications, Table 6 shows the results with
poverty rates as the dependent variable. Similarly, we see that horizontal dynastic
status does not cause a reduction in poverty.
The takeaway is that horizontal dynastic status leads to higher levels of government spending but not to higher levels of development. In particular, the results
suggest that increased spending is potentially driven by corruption and rent-seeking.
To test the RD’s identifying assumptions, we augment our previous test for covariate balance to include the night lights and poverty variable. We find that covariate
means are smooth around the cutoff (see Figure C2). In addition, we check for potential manipulation using the McCrary (2008) test and find no evidence of manipulation
(see Figure C6).

6
6.1

Identification Checks
Political Parties and Political Dynasties

Despite the significant effects in the previous sections, it is possible that what is
driving our results is not horizontal dynastic status per se, but the fact that members
of the same family are more likely to belong to the same party. Party alignment
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Note: Robust standard errors clustered at the province level are in parentheses. Dependent variable is log night lights
per capita in a municipality or city. Horizontal dynasty is a dummy that takes the value 1 (0) if the mayor’s relative
wins (loses) the election.

Dep Var Mean
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Table 5 Horizontal Dynasties and Night Lights
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Table 6 Horizontal Dynasties and Poverty
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may also serve to align preferences, induce coordination, and increase government
spending in the municipality (Aldrich, 1995). To address this concern, we include a
control for whether the dynasty pair belongs to the same party or not. As the results
in Table 3 Panel B show, being in the same party does not matter, or when it does,
the effect of family similarity is not diminished and remains statistically significant.
This result corroborates our first hypothesis: horizontal dynasties spend more than
non-horizontal dynasties, even after controlling for belonging to the same party.
For the second hypothesis, we may again be concerned that being from the same
family proxies for being in the same party. That is, it is possible that belonging to
the same political party, not having kinship ties, is what prevents political conflict
due to established party rules (party leaders deciding who to field and disallowing
party mates to compete against each other). Results in Table 4 Panel B support our
argument: being in the same party generally does not matter, or when it does, the
effect of family similarity is not diminished and remains statistically significant.
Apart from the statistical results, there are conceptual reasons as to why parties
do not serve as vehicles for coordination in the context of the Philippines. Parties
in the Philippines have low levels of party institutionalization, little differentiation
between parties in terms of ideology, and fleeting alliances of convenience rather than
stable unions of like-minded politicians (Hicken, 2009). In particular, these fleeting
alliances of convenience suggest that politicians from the same party cannot work
together over policy because they cannot trust that their preferences will be aligned
throughout the span of the policy. For example, two politicians from the same party
may agree to build a road, but one politician may jump to a rival party in the middle
of road construction. This would potentially prevent the road from being completed,

38

and in the case of a rent-seeking politician, potentially prevent extraction from taking
place.

6.2

Local Resources and Political Networks

To test the claim that preference alignment, and not village networks or brand name
advantage, is driving our results, we use an alternative measure called F amilyN etworksit ,
which measures the number of family members who run for office as a control variable augmenting the panel fixed effects regression.19 This measure captures political
resources because it takes substantial resources to run for local office while disentangling the effect of actually holding office. This measure does not imply the actual holding of political office—a necessary condition for our argument. In Table 7,
F amilyN etworksit is either negative or not statistically significant, while the coefficient on HorizontalDynastyit remains positive and statistically significant. This
result implies that the effect of dynastic status on spending was being driven by multiple family members explicitly using the powers of political office to forward policy
change, rather than through the resources or networks that these families already
possessed.

6.3

Political Experience and Term Limits

Another explanation for why horizontal dynasties lead to higher spending is that
dynastic mayors may be more experienced, have more political connections or obtain
greater political ability through longer tenure. We construct a variable for whether
19

Note that we cannot test this mechanism using the RDD where our sample is limited
to two-member dynasties. For this test, we make use of panel fixed effects regression where
HorizontalDynastyit is defined as dynasties with two or more members simultaneously holding
office.
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Table 7 Local Resources and Political Networks
Horizontal Dynasty

(1)
0.125∗∗∗
(0.0302)

(2)
0.225∗∗∗
(0.0352)

7.06

-0.0725∗∗∗
(0.0133)
7.06

.0032
12,098

.00766
12,098

Family Networks
Dep Var Mean
Municipal FE
Year FE
Adj. R2
N

(3)
0.0188∗∗
(0.00750)

(4)
0.0273∗∗∗
(0.00903)

7.06
×
×
.897
12,098

-0.00747
(0.00521)
7.06
×
×
.897
12,098

Note: Robust standard errors clustered at the province level are in parentheses. Dependent variable is log spending per capita in a municipality or
city. Horizontal dynasty is a dummy that takes the value 1 (0) if the mayor’s
relative wins (loses) the election. Family networks is the number of members
in a political dynasty who run for any local office within the province.

the mayor is a first termer and see that controlling for political experience does not
impact the horizontal dynasty coefficient (see Panel A of Table D1). A similar test
is to compare term limited and non-term limited mayors. Results in Panel B show
that while for some specifications, term limits are correlated with higher spending,
the effect of horizontal dynasties does not diminish and remains significant. We also
control for term more flexibly in Panel C and find similar results.

6.4

State Capacity

Another potential mechanism consistent with our results is state capacity. First,
more competent states are able to spend more through a variety of mechanisms:
less bottlenecks in the bureaucracy, more efficient generation of local revenues for
government projects and potentially higher human capital (Dittmar and Meisenzahl,
2019; Grindle and Hilderbrand, 1995). Second, higher state capacity areas may be
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less prone to political conflict—rent-seeking politicians have less incentives to extract
in higher quality states because the office has lower economic value.
To address this concern, we control for state capacity and observe the change in
the Horizontal Dynastyit coefficient. Although it is hard to capture state capacity in
a single variable, we follow the existing literature and use the municipality’s share of
tax revenues in total municipal revenues as our measure for state capacity (Dincecco,
2017). Across all specifications, the coefficient on HorizontalDynastyit from Table
D2 is unchanged compared to coefficients in Table 3. State capacity does not seem
to matter for spending once we account for horizontal dynastic status.

6.5

National Connections

Finally, we check whether political connections with the central government, and
not working together through local politics, is driving our results. To do this, we
examine whether mayor-congressman pairs are driving our results. The concern is
that national political connections and transfers via congressmen’s pork barrel or
influence over the national budget may explain a substantial amount of variation.
Furthermore, given that mayor-congressperson dyads (legislative connections) contribute to government spending largely through national transfers from the central
to the local government, and our current measure of local government spending only
captures local municipal spending excluding national transfers, we expect the impact
of dynastic status to originate mostly from political offices that have direct influence
over municipal spending (executive connections such as mayor, vice mayor, governor
and vice governor). Table D2 provides supporting evidence that legislative connections indeed have no impact on municipal spending.
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7

Conclusion

This paper has argued that horizontal dynasties increase levels of government spending by Philippine mayors. Mayors are able to do so because having another family
member in political office allows both to coordinate their political plans via aligned
preferences. But increases in spending do not lead to higher levels of development,
suggesting that spending may be a source of rent extraction. We tested this argument’s implications by using a regression discontinuity design leveraging close elections for local political office. Our results show that: (i) horizontally dynastic mayors
have higher levels of spending than non-dynastic mayors, and (ii) these differences in
spending are rooted in preference alignment between different family members of the
dynasty, and (iii) horizontal dynasties do not lead to higher levels of development in
terms of greater economic wealth or lower poverty.
Although empirically specific to the Philippines, the argument provides a general framework exploring how horizontal political dynasties navigate the constraints
foisted upon politicians by political conflict. If political actors can organize themselves
in social groups that (i) share similar preferences over political goals and (ii) concurrently hold positions of political power, then these groups may be able to strategically
place themselves across various political positions in a way that undermines formal
checks and balances. Potential scope conditions for our argument include: (i) different
political offices with the potential for political conflict due to politicians’ potentially
divergent preferences, and (ii) the weakness or inability of formal institutions, such
as political parties, to coordinate behavior across offices.
Although we have explored an argument of how dynasties function, more work
needs to be done on this topic. For example, it would be fruitful to consider how
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dynastic strength affects economic and political outcomes. Furthermore, existing research has not yet examined the causes or consequences of dynastic prevalence across
forms of government. The potential differences between dynastic functioning in strong
and weak democracies, or in autocracies, is still a relatively unexplored area, especially in the theoretical sense. Ultimately, understanding informal political structures
like political dynasties provides us with a deeper comprehension of the ecosystem of
organizations that politicians form to circumvent or aid formal institutions like political parties, providing us with a richer appreciation of the dynamic elements of
politics.
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Online Appendix A: Key Horizontal Relationships
This subsection examines the horizontal dynastic relationships most relevant to the
mayor. The qualitative interviews identified these important positions. It is worth
noting that these relationships are not restricted to the mayor’s own municipality.
For example, mayors may coordinate with other mayors in the same province. These
insights also add credibility to the decision to identify horizontal dynasties at the
province (and not municipality) level.
Mayors and Vice mayors: Vice mayors have the capacity to affect a mayor’s
policy choices. A vice mayor’s most general responsibility is to assist the mayor in
a variety of ways as the mayor sees fit. According to the LGC, the vice mayor shall
“exercise such other powers and perform such other duties and functions as may be
prescribed by law or ordinance”, which in practice corresponds to what the mayor
prescribes. A specific responsibility of interest for this study is to be the presiding
officer of the municipal board (LGC Section 445)—the municipality’s legislative arm
with veto power over the mayor. Vice mayors can thus potentially exert substantial
influence over the municipal board’s voting patterns. This is a potential legal means
by which vice mayors may exert pressure on the mayor when political conflict ensues.
Mayors and Governors: Governors and mayors are another dyadic relationship
that often interact in ways that affect the mayor’s public spending policies. In many
ways governors function like mayors at a higher level of jurisdiction. According to
LGC Section 465, governors “exercise general supervision and control over all programs, projects, services, and activities of the provincial government”. As the local
executive of a similar yet larger jurisdiction, they have their own set of policies to
implement. As such governors are also subjected to similar political constraints, for
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example from the provincial legislature. In relation to mayors, one relevant function
of governors is the approval of municipal projects. This implies that they have oversight responsibilities over their constituent mayors. In particular, governors approve
two types of projects: maintenance and operations projects (such as social services)
and capital outlay projects (such as infrastructure). Maintenance projects need to
be approved within a specified amount of time, but curiously, capital outlay projects
have no specified approval period, and hence may be held in limbo indefinitely. We
can see here how governors who are in conflict with their mayors may use their legally
provided supervisory power to stifle a mayor’s projects.
Mayors and Other Mayors in the Province: Two mayors from different municipalities in the province can, if their interests are aligned, work together to affect
each others government spending choices. This is possible because, as noted above,
each mayor has substantial control over his or her own budget, and therefore working
with other mayors becomes a matter of whether both are interested in doing business with the other. For example, mayors may coordinate over large infrastructural
projects, such as roads that go from one municipality to the other. Conversely, the
failure of mayors to coordinate may lead to lower levels of government spending. A
current pressing issue in the Philippines today is the lack of infrastructure and relevant urban planning in Metro Manila. The major political economy constraint is that
mayors fail to coordinate over these infrastructure projects, and hence these projects
are yet to be enacted (Talabong, 2019; Vergara, 2019).
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Online Appendix B: Identifying Dynastic Relations
How do we identify family members given our data? For some existing studies,
identification follows naturally from definition given the availability of data. For
example, Folke et al. (2017) and Eggers and Hainmueller (2009) use birth registers
and historical biographies to identify family connections. However, in the absence of
high quality data, we exploit naming conventions to identify dynastic relations (as is
common in the literature in developing countries).
In the Philippines, the naming tradition is as follows:
given_name middle_name last_name
The given name may consist of one or more names. Although the middle name
is used as in the United States, the main difference is that it must be the mother’s
maiden name. The middle name is not considered a surname, and the mother’s
maiden name comes before the father’s surname. In the Philippines, only the last
name, which comes from the father’s last name, is considered an individual’s surname.
When males get married, no change occurs in their names.20
Following the existing literature, we identify family networks via a matching procedure where individuals with identical surnames residing in the same province are
considered related. Two errors associated with this method: (i) false negatives and
(ii) false positives.
The issue of false negatives is not very problematic in that a dynasty that is not
identified only makes it harder to detect a significant effect. If one believes that
dynasties are better (worse) in a particular outcome, then being identified as nondynasty decreases (increase) the point estimate. In both cases, the effect is attenuated
20

For females, however, the usual practice is to take on the spouse’s last name.
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and serves as the lower (upper) bound of the true parameters. Another reason why
this does not pose a significant problem is that married women who are part of a
dynasty normally use the name that provides greater electoral advantage.21
The issue of false positives is that if there are many common last names within a
province, then there would be substantial errors in how we identify dynasties. Compared to other countries, we argue that this is not a major issue for the Philippines,
because the modal surname accounts for only 0.32% of all last names.22 Moreover,
Querubin (2016) recounts that in 1849, Spanish officials, concerned with the arbitrary
selection of surnames by Filipinos, assigned different names to different family heads
in each town. This led to a catalog of about 61,000 different surnames.23 Although
this may not completely eliminate concerns over correctly identifying dynasties, we
believe that in the Philippines the concern of incorrectly matching last names is
greatly ameliorated.

21

For example, the Binay dynasty has ruled the city of Makati from 1986 until the present, where
several family members have simultaneously and sequentially held office as mayor, vice mayor and
congressperson. The current mayor of Makati is Abigail Binay-Campos, who does not use her
husband’s last name in campaigns and other election-related documents. In the dataset, she is listed
as Abigail Binay, her maiden name. On the contrary, consider Lucy Torres-Gomez, wife of Richard
Gomez, a popular actor in Philippine show business. Given the prominence of her husband, she
has constantly used her hyphenated surname in campaigns and other paraphernalia. She appears
as Lucy Torres-Gomez in the dataset and therefore is considered a member of the Gomez dynasty
in Ormoc City.
22
Fafchamps and Labonne (2017) note that in other Asian countries, modal last names are more
common: China (7.25%), India (5.5%), Taiwan (11%) and Vietnam (38%).
23
Querubin (2016) explains in detail the historical account of name distribution in the Philippines.
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What explains the persistence of political dynasties over time? We argue
that dynasties remain in power by adhering to norms that prioritize internal
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prioritizing stability even when the information may lead to improved odds of
electoral victory. We test this argument empirically in several steps. Using a
regression discontinuity design on close elections in the Philippines, we establish
the first place effect: first placers are 5-9% more likely to seek election to higher
office than comparable second placers. We then document the family first effect: first place effects are overturned when family linkages between politicians
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1

Introduction

Theories of political and economic modernization posit that as nations become wealthier and more democratic they become more formal and procedural, moving away
from personalistic and family-based systems towards more impersonal and meritocratic modes of politics. This makes the continued existence of families in politics so
difficult to explain. Political families are still prevalent in politics all over the world,
from developing nations such as the Philippines to rich countries like Japan and the
United States. This pits the reality of their dynastic persistence against central theories of political development. Why do political dynasties persist over time and what
allows them to maintain their grip on power? Previous work has focused on the role
of incumbency advantage in the persistence of political families. Existing scholarship
suggests that incumbency impacts dynastic persistence through access to resources,
social networks and name recognition (Dal Bo et al., 2009; Querubin, 2016; Smith
and Martin, 2017; Rossi, 2017). However, these explanations are neither specific to
dynasties themselves nor particular to their personalistic nature. Moreover, for dynasties to exist in spite of political and economic development, they must function in
ways that are different from existing formal political organizations.
Despite their prevalence, surprisingly little is known about how political dynasties
take advantage of their family structure to perpetuate in politics. In this paper, we
address this gap by examining the link between the electoral system and dynasties’
internal organization. We argue that dynasties internalize information from the distribution of votes in a way that is distinct from both standard political actors such
as parties or voters. Whereas parties use vote distribution as information to identify
popular politicians and maximize their chances of holding a particular office (Folke
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et al., 2016), and voters use vote distribution as a way to coordinate behavior around
a particular candidate (Anagol and Fujiwara, 2016), dynasties are less inclined to use
vote distribution as information. They instead rely on a set of norms prioritizing internal stability the maintenance of the family alliance. Dynasties therefore prioritize
internal order and the preservation of dynastic alliances, and are less likely to use
information that may increase the probability of winning of doing so conflicts with
familial stability.
We examine this question by exploiting the presence of rank effects—the effect of
ranking higher in an election with multiple seats on the increased probability of running for higher office. Rank effects are an ideal setting to test our argument for various
reasons. The first reason is conceptual. Rank effects directly test the link between
electoral rules and dynastic organization. Rank is used by both parties and voters
as information to determine who to promote or who to support. Parties and voters
support higher ranked candidates. Unlike these other major politics actors, dynasties neglect the information from rank effects and focus instead on internal stability.
The implication is that unlike parties, families trade-off the probability of winning—
choosing the higher ranked candidate to run for political office—for stability—the
ranked candidate does not run in order to preserve the integrity of the family. The
second reason is empirical. Rank effects, by comparing both winning politicians, are
able to parse out effects due to incumbency and isolate effects which are solely due
to electoral rank. Finally, rank effects are generalizable. They are pervasive across
electoral systems—from open list proportional representation to first past the post—
and levels of political and economic development—in countries as varied as Canada,
Brazil, India, and Spain (Anagol and Fujiwara, 2016; Folke et al., 2016; Merillainen
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and Tukiainen, 2018; Fujiwara and Sanz, 2019).
We test the implications of this argument in the context of local governments in the
Philippines. We use all available elections data from 1,635 cities and municipalities
and 42,045 villages from 1988 to 2016. The dataset includes candidates’ names, votes
obtained and party affiliation. Following existing literature in political economy in
the Philippines, we make use of last names to infer family relationships.
First, we establish the existence of a first place effect: the effect of ranking first
(versus second) on the probability of running for higher office. Comparing first and
second placers is problematic due to selection issues: higher ranked candidates may
have more resources, innate ability or larger networks. To address these endogeneity
concerns, we employ a regression discontinuity design on close elections between first
and second placers. First place councilors in close elections are 5-9% more likely to
run for a higher political office—a result that holds in all levels of local government.
This finding is robust to different specifications and bandwidth values, and satisfies
covariate balance. This result is consistent with the extant literature—political actors
use rank as information that determines their probability of winning elections.
Second, we document a novel phenomenon we call the family first effect, where
political dynasties do not respond to rank information and overturn the first place
effect. We perform a heterogeneous effects regression, interacting rank with the dynasty variable to quantify the difference in the rank effect between dynasties and
non-dynasties. Our results show that first placers with a family member in higher
office are 2-12% less likely to seek higher office. Combining these with the previous
results, we find that the family first effect offsets the first place effect. This result
implies that political families do not respond to rank information even when that
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information may result in increased odds of winning elections.
Next, we provide empirical evidence suggesting that the family first effect is consistent with preferences for internal stability and robustness. We do this in two
ways. First, we exploit the existence of term limits in the Philippines, which restrict
politicians from running for reelection after their third consecutive term in office.
The extant qualitative literature on the Philippines argues that dynasties operate
according to seniority norms. More senior members of the family take precedence
in political office over their junior counterparts, even when those junior politicians
may be more competent. We should therefore see that rank effects are absent when
the senior politician in a higher political office is not term limited. Juniors within
the family wait their turn. We perform a ‘triple-difference’ specification interacting
rank, dynasty and term limits to explore how term limits matter for the family first
effect. Incorporating the third difference allows us to compare the family first effect
for (i) when both politicians (in higher and lower office) are term limited, and for
(ii) the remaining sample, i.e. when either one or both of them are not term limited.
Estimating this triple difference regression, we find that for the term limited sample, the family first effect switches sign and magnifies the first place effects. When
faced with term limits, political dynasties are even more likely than non-dynasties
to encourage the candidate in lower office to fill the vacancy in higher office. In the
non-term limited sample, the family first effect remains negative and robust, implying
that in times when term limits do not bind, political dynasties simply let incumbents
occupy their respective positions. This implies that dynasties use rank information
only when it does not violate the dynasties’ internal norms.
Second, since patriarchal norms characterize the internal organization of political
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dynasties, women are more likely to serve as benchwarmers for male members of
the family. We therefore expect to see that, on average, women in higher office are
more likely to be replaced by their male counterparts than an otherwise similar male
politician. Using a similar ‘triple-difference’ specification as above, but using gender
as the third variable, we find that rank effects are higher for female leaders (with male
subordinates) than other gender pairs. This suggests that dynasties seem to have a
strong preference for men occupying higher office, or for women to occupy higher office
only when there are no other male candidates. Together, these results imply that
dynasties make decisions over political participation consistent with considerations
towards internal stability and robustness.
Finally, we test alternative mechanisms that may explain our benchmark results.
We rule out a number of potential explanations for our findings. First, we show that
party alignment is not driving our results. Second, we note that our results are not
due to voters using rank as a way to coordinate behavior. Third, we show that our
results are not driven by dynasties being lower quality politicians and hence being
more reluctant to seek public office. Finally, we find that dynasties do not necessarily
obtain better private information (e.g. on elections, winnability) that can substitute
for rank, which is public knowledge. Overall, these alternative explanations are hard
to reconcile with the evidence we presented, suggesting the important role that norms
and family stability play in the persistence of political dynasties.
Our paper most directly contributes to the literature on political dynasties. A
growing literature on the political family has thus far focused on dynastic selection,
most particularly the dynastic incumbency advantage—holding political office has a
causal effect on the probability of having future relatives in office (Dal Bo et al., 2009;
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Querubin, 2016; Fiva and Smith, 2018; Van Coppenolle, 2017)—or on the social and
economic outcomes that accrue from dynastic status (Folke et al., 2017; Geys and
Smith, 2017; George, 2019). Recent work also argues that family networks serve as
vehicles for improving clientelistic political exchange (Cruz et al., 2017). Our paper
argues that at the most fundamental level, dynasties survive and thrive because they
prioritize internal stability, allowing them to pursue these other functions.
We also contribute to the literature on rank effects (Anagol and Fujiwara, 2016;
Fujiwara and Sanz, 2019; Folke et al., 2016). These papers have proposed arguments
for why rank effects persist. For example, voters strategically vote for the higher
ranked candidate, or parties select the first ranked candidate. However, none of these
papers show how informal political institutions, in particular the political dynasty,
can mitigate rank effects. We provide, to the best of our knowledge, the first argument
that does so.
Most broadly, we contribute to the literature on how culture and norms affect electoral success. Thus far the role of norms in the decision-making of political organizations has been relatively understudied when compared to the various canonical papers
of how rational choice calculus affects politician’s actions (Downs, 1957; Buchanan
and Tullock, 1962). But norms have been shown to affect various aspects of economic
and political life (Elster, 1989; Greif, 2006). We extend the norms framework to
political organizations.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The next section describes
some features of the institutional background in the Philippines. Section 3 discusses
the elections and other auxiliary data analyzed while Section 4 expounds on our
identification strategy. Sections 5 and 6 provide the main estimates and document
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Figure 1: Political Structure in the Philippines

the first place effect and family first effect, respectively. Section 7 proposes our
mechanism of succession norms, and Section 8 examines alternative mechanisms and
explanations. Finally, Section 9 concludes and provides directions for future work.

2
2.1

Institutional Background
Local Governments in the Philippines

There are three main levels of local government in the Philippines—provinces, cities
or municipalities, and villages. All three levels share a similar political structure. The
different levels of government and their breakdown into different branches can be seen
in Figure 1.
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The most aggregated level of local government in the Philippines is the province.
The executive and legislative branches of a province are headed by a governor and a
vice governor, respectively, who attain office through plurality elections. The legislative branch is composed of the sangguniang panlalawigan (provincial board), charged
with creating laws to be implemented at the provincial level. Each province is subdivided into two to eight provincial districts, each represented by at least one board
member.1 The provincial board varies in number depending on the income and population of the province, numbering between 6 to 14 members per province. Among the
most important responsibilities of the provincial board is to create ordinances—local
laws—to be implemented by the provincial executive. Provincial boards also create
resolutions—statements of policy or an order of the provincial board that a specific
action be taken.
Provinces are composed of municipalities. Municipalities are led by mayors and
vice mayors and create local laws or ordinances through a city or municipal legislature.
In this sense, they function similarly to governors and vice governors at the provincial
level, just at a lower level of aggregation.2 Most municipalities have one legislative
district which elects the sangguniang panlungsod/bayan (city council) composed of
eight to twelve councilors. Like the provincial board, the city or municipal council
1

Note that there are different types of local legislative districts: (i) provincial districts, (ii)
congressional districts, (iii) city or municipal districts and (iv) village districts. In this paper,
we exclude congressional districts from the analysis since only one congressperson wins in each
congressional district. Hence, comparing the top vote getter and the second highest would combine
both rank and incumbency effects.
2
The primary distinction between cities and municipalities is the level of income and population
size. To be considered a city, a given area must have at least 100 million Philippine pesos (equivalent
to approximately $2 million) in annual income and at least 150,000 residents. Cities also receive a
larger allotment of revenue from the national government, so municipalities usually aspire to become
cities. For simplicity, we will use municipalities in the following sections to refer to both cities and
municipalities.
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creates ordinances and resolutions for the municipality and is headed by the vice
mayor.
Finally, cities and municipalities are composed of villages, called barangays in the
Philippines. Villages are composed of the punong barangay (village chair), charged
with general executive and legislative functions such as drafting and implementing
ordinances and resolutions, enacting the budget, as well as delivering basic goods and
services. All villages have one legislative district and the sangguniang barangay (village council), headed by the village chair, is composed of 7 members. Similar to other
levels of local government, the village council is tasked with creating ordinances and
resolutions. The main difference between the village and the larger constituencies is
that the village chair assumes both executive and legislative functions, while those are
distinct in cities (mayor and vice mayor) and provinces (governor and vice governor).

2.2

Local Electoral System

Elections for provincial and municipal levels occur every three years, while elections at
the village level take place every three to five years (depending on Congress approval).
Figure 2 shows a timeline of all local elections in the Philippines since 1988. All local
positions face a three-term limit. Elections for governors and vice governors, mayors
and vice mayors, and village chairs follow a first-past-the-post electoral scheme. The
corresponding local legislatures (provincial boards, city or municipal councils and
village councils) follow a plurality-at-large electoral system.3 Each province or city
3

The term at-large is loosely used here. For provinces, provincial board members are elected atlarge at the district level. The same is true for cities with two or more districts. Hence, for Manila,
there are six districts with six councilors each. Only candidates in the first district will compete with
each other, and respectively for the second to sixth districts. Politician rank is determined within
the district, not across districts. For cities with one district, municipalities and villages, councilors
are elected at-large (i.e. at the entire municipal or village level).
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Figure 2: Election Timeline
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Note. PC refers to provincial and city elections while V refers to village elections. The
circles are not vertically aligned since provincial and city elections occur every May of each
election year while village elections occur every October. Those shaded in black are elections
not included in the final sample due to incomplete subsequent elections data.

has n elected board members or councilors while each village has exactly 7 elected
councilors. Provinces and cities maybe divided into d districts, with each district
having

2.3

n
d

positions.4

Political Ladder and Succession

Across all levels of government, there are no significant differences between councilors
in terms of duties, responsibilities and political power. The only difference lies in
the constitutional provision of succession rules. In a municipality, if a mayor dies
or vacates his/her office, the vice mayor assumes the position of the mayor and the
municipal council member with the highest rank becomes the vice mayor.5 If both
the mayor and vice mayor are permanently removed, the first and second highest
ranking councilors become the mayor and vice mayor respectively. This implies a
succession rule based on vote-based ranking. The logic is similar for the province and
village—rank in the provincial board determines succession if the governor and/or
vice governor are permanently removed, and rank in the village council determines
4

There are exceptions to this rule. For example, there are cases when a province that has 3
districts and 10 board members may have a 3-3-4 allocation.
5
In areas with more than one district, constitutional rank is determined based on a candidate’s
total votes obtained over the number of voters in his/her respective legislative district.
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who replaces the village chair (Local Government Code Title II, Chapter 2). These
succession rules also imply that the executive positions are considered more highly
coveted political offices than legislative positions. The reason is straightforward: local
executives have control over the budget and the enactment of policy.
For example, the position of mayor is highly sought after in local politics, a consequence of the control mayors exert over local policy-making. Sidel (1999) argued
that the position of mayor was a major prize, the benefits associated with it being
“the awarding of building permits, the passage of municipal zoning ordinances, the use
of government-owned land, the allocation of public works, the approval of reclamation
projects.....[and] the awarding of petty monopoly franchises and concessions”.
The same is true for provincial politics where governors head the province, vice
governors play a supporting role (and can replace the governor if the latter is incapacitated or unable to fulfill his/her duties), and provincial board members serve below
the governor and vice governor. For the village, however, the local chief executive
is the village chair and there is no vice chair (unlike in the provincial and municipal
levels).

2.4

Political Dynasties and Persistence

Political dynasties—a collection of family members occupying political office either
concurrently or through time—are the core unit of local political organization, existing
alongside and embedded within formal institutions such as political parties (Fegan,
1993).6 Prominent political analysts have noted that families are an organizational
expression of the century-long dominance over local governments by local elites. Po6

It is worth stressing that parties continue to be relegated to the sidelines of Philippine politics.
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litical clans “are an enduring feature of Philippine politics”, and have “displayed an
uncanny ability to adapt to the changing landscape of Philippine politics” (Coronel,
2004). That is, while Philippine politics features the formal rules and institutions
that usually accompany democratic governments, these rules and institutions are underpinned, and indeed fundamentally driven, by informal structures, in this case the
political family (McCoy, 2009).
Ethnographic work supports this claim: Coronel (2004) identifies the family as
the fundamental political institution through which coalitionist goals are achieved:
“The family...became the main instrument for contesting elections, expanding political
power, and amassing wealth. The kinship network that makes up the clans became
the core political organization”. Most telling may be the stated opinions of family
politicians themselves. When Ramon Durano, former mayor of Danao City, was
questioned by foreign journalists about family members in local office, he replied:
“politics is not something you can entrust to non-relatives” (Cullinane, 1993).
Political families remain prominent in contemporary Philippine politics (Querubin,
2016). Families also differ in their organizational structure with regard to holding
political office. Some families are vertical dynasties—different members of the same
family hold a given political office over time. Others are horizontal dynasties—two
or more members of the same family hold different political offices concurrently.

2.5

Internal Structure of the Political Dynasty

While political families function as political organizations, they differ in important
ways from most formal political organizations. Formal organizations are impersonal
and bureaucratic. They value political goals, with the individuals that comprise these
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organizations are subservient to organizational ends. Political families, on the other
hand, prioritize unity and stability between the members of the family. Grossholtz
(1964) emphasizes these internal dynamics when she describes the Philippine political
family as “the strongest unit of society, demanding the deepest loyalties of the individual”. She further contrasts the family as unique from other political institutions
by nothing that “the communal values of the family are often in conflict with the
interpersonal values of the institutions of the larger society”.
Beckett (1993) further emphasizes the natural tendency towards internal unity
among families, while acknowledging their occasional fragmentation: “while a family may be divided momentarily, the norms and sentiments that define it transcend
particularities...the anger is forgotten, siblings reconciled, and families reunited”.
Members of political families must therefore subsume their own personal ambitions
for the unity of the family. Families that stay united must operate according to
the rules of the family, which are in some ways representative of the social norms
of the broader society. We focus on two particular elements of family structure—
hierarchy and patriarchy. Hierarchy in the setting of political families means that
senior members of the family, or members of the family with more political experience,
are favored for holding higher office than their junior counterparts, who have to wait
their turn. Patriarchy within the context of the family means that female members of
the family are often passed over, and hence less likely to hold office, than their male
counterparts.
Hierarchy, in terms of deference to senior members, is a central aspect of Philippine
families. It is no different for political families. Younger members of the political
dynasty often have to wait for more senior members of the family to complete their
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terms before replacing them. This strategy also makes strategic sense since horizontal
dynasties allow for members of the same political family to coordinate over policy
(Dulay and Go, 2019). This was the underlying logic behind the imposition of term
limits in the 1987 Philippine Constitution. Otherwise, senior members of the family
would simply hold political office indefinitely.
Philippine society is patriarchal, and Philippine politics follows suit. Men have
always been strongly overrepresented in political positions. Around 70% percent of the
current Congress and Senate of the Philippines are male. In our sample, which ranges
from 1988 to 2016, 83% of governors, 85% of mayors, and 76% of village heads are
male. Female politicians often serve as placeholders once their male counterparts in
the political family reach their term limit. Labonne et al. (2017) show this empirically
and note that, because of social norms, female representation is to a large extent
driven by dynastic political strategies; they serve as “benchwarmers” for their male
counterparts and are eventually replaced by them again (Coronel, 2004).
The following example illustrates well both the hierarchical and patriarchal nature
of family politics. Jejomar Binay, the recent vice-president of the Philippines, was the
mayor of Makati City from 1988 to 1998. He then reached his term limit and stepped
down while his wife, Elenita Binay, served as mayor from 1998 to 2001. From 2001
to 2010 Jejomar Binay returned to serve as mayor of Makati. A second is sample is
Pasig City. From 1992 to 2001 Vicente Eusebio served as mayor of the city. Once
he reached his term limit his wife Soleded Eusebio served as mayor from 2001 to
2004. After one term she stepped down to let her son, Robert Eusebio, begin another
three-term reign as mayor.
The internal stability of a dynasty is paramount to the continued political success
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and longevity of its members. The dynasty provides its members with access to
resources, name recognition, and political networks (Dal Bo et al., 2009; Chhibber,
2013; Smith, 2018). Once the dynasty breaks apart, its members may lose access
to these advantages, and this may hamper their political competitiveness and even
prevent them from engaging in politics altogether.
McCoy (2009) emphasizes the specific advantages families bring, saying that “along
with their land and capital, elite families. . . are often thought to transmit their character and characteristics to a younger generation.” Beckett (1993) supports the importance of the stability to the family’s organization, arguing that the family’s advantages
were “predicated upon continuity” and that integral to the concept of the political
family is the belief that the characteristics of the family (material or otherwise) are
“transmitted from generation to generation rather than dying with the individuals who
manifest them at a particular time.” 7
The extant literature would thus suggest that political families operate according
norms of hierarchy and patriarchy. Observing both in the data supports this claim.

3

Data

Using the Philippine setting, this paper explores the political outcomes of council
members at different levels of local government. We focus on the municipal and
village levels given the larger sample sizes needed to obtain precise RDD estimates.
In addition, to analyze our main mechanism of political dynasties, the RDD setup
7

Beckett (1993) also provides an example of the Sinsuat political family, claiming that their
defeats in politics were due largely to “internal rivalries”.
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requires enough variation in family relationships which the provincial level lacks.8
The dependent variables of interest are whether a candidate runs in, and wins, a
subsequent election for a higher position. The elections data do not contain numeric
politician identifiers, so individuals are determined using a name matching technique
that matches both first and last names of candidates within the same province. This
is done for two reasons. First, it is very uncommon and costly for candidates to run in
provinces different from their own. Second, we do this to prevent false matches—the
larger the constituency considered, the higher probability of having similar names. In
Appendix A, we consider other more stringent matching techniques where we match,
in addition to first and last names, the suffix, the middle initial or the middle name.
Results are robust to these stricter matching rules.
The main independent variable is rank, which is based on a candidate’s total votes
obtained in his/her respective district. In cases where multiple candidates tie for the
same rank, we exclude these elections in our analysis.9 Given that our study focuses
on the first place effect, we limit our sample to the first and second placers in each
legislative district.

3.1

Elections Data

Province and City | Provincial and city elections are held every three years since
1992.10 We focus on post-Marcos era elections for two reasons: first, the Philippine
8

Since there are only 81 provinces in the Philippines, the possibility of provincial board members
being related to the vice governor is small. In the data, only 0.8% of board members (25 of 3,178)
are related to the vice governor, which does not allow for precise RDD estimates.
9
Including them in the analysis does not change our results. The proportion of elections for which
candidates tied for first is negligible: 0.05% for provincial elections, 0.3% for city elections and 2%
for village elections.
10
The exception to this rule is 1988, the first local elections after the martial law. After 1988, the
elections were held in 1992 and then three years thereafter.
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political landscape changed dramatically as a result of the decades-long Marcos dictatorship; second, the available data starts from 1988 to 2016. We exclude 2016 since
the dependent variable is missing without data on the subsequent election. Hence,
the provincial dataset contains 3,606 observations, while the city dataset contains
29,540 observations.

Village | Village elections are supposedly held every three years, although they have
been postponed several times in the past. Given that village elections are done manually, election records are only available from 2002, 2007, 2010 and 2013. However, for
2002 and 2007, only the winning candidates are listed in the election returns, and for
2013, constructing the dependent variable requires the following election data. For
this reason, we only use the years 2007 and 2010 for our regressions. The final village
dataset contains 159,994 observations.

3.2

Other Data

Voter Information | Voter turnout data can be used to understand the mechanism of voter coordination. We calculate voter turnout in each provincial and city
legislative district from 2004 to 2013 by dividing the number of registered to actual
voters. Unfortunately, the data is not available for the village level.

Ordinances | As objective measures for performance and productivity in the council, we collected a novel dataset of city ordinances from more than 30 cities in the
Philippines. Conditional on choosing the city, we obtained all city ordinances for
years which data is available. The dataset includes thousands of ordinances from
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1988-2019, and contains the ordinance title, date of enactment and the names of the
sponsors or authors.

Newspaper Presence | To control for the potential role of media in establishing
rank effects, we have data on the number of newspapers, total circulation and frequency for each province in 2005. Since the dataset is only available for the year
2005, we link it with the closest election year, 2007, and compare provinces that have
greater media presence as proxied by the variables above.

Online News Mentions | An emerging source for news in the Philippines are websites or online platforms of newspapers and broadsheets. To measure media exposure,
we scanned the websites of top regional and provincial newspapers and created an
algorithm to count the number of times a particular candidate’s name was mentioned.
We did this for 29 provincial news sites, scanning all news articles from 2008 to 2019.

3.3

Identifying Family Linkages

In the absence of high-quality data, we identify family members by exploiting naming
traditions and matching surnames (Braganca et al., 2015; Querubin, 2016). We follow
the existing literature and infer family linkages between politicians who share the same
last name, both of whom occupy political office in the same constituency at the same
election period. In our paper, we focus on a specific dynastic relationship, where the
legislator or councilor is related to the politician occupying the higher office.11 This
means that we consider family links between the vice governor and provincial board
11

While we use a narrower definition than is used in existing literature, this helps us establish our
proposed mechanism and rule out alternative explanations.
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Table 1: Summary Statistics
N

Mean

Std. Dev.

Min

Max

Province: Board Members
Run for Vice Governor
Dynasty (with Any)
Dynasty (with Vice Governor)
Term
Male

3,326
3,609
3,609
3,757
3,523

0.0878
0.4145
0.0010
1.5225
0.8286

0.2830
0.4927
0.0994
0.7062
0.3770

0
0
0
1
0

1
1
1
3
1

City: Councilors
Run for Vice Mayor
Dynasty (with Any)
Dynasty (with Vice Mayor)
Term
Male

29,476
32,816
32,816
32,820
30,211

0.1704
0.1208
0.0233
1.5908
0.80

0.3760
0.3259
0.1509
0.7409
0.40

0
0
0
1
0

1
1
1
3
1

Village: Councilors
Run for Chair
Dynasty (with Any)
Dynasty (with Chair)
Term
Male

163,817 0.1342
163,817 0.1689
163,817 0.0586
163,817 1.4640
163,817 0.6689

0.3409
0.3746
0.2349
0.6169
0.4706

0
0
0
1
0

1
1
1
3
1

member (for the province), the vice mayor and city councilor (for the city), and the
village chair and village councilor (for the village). Appendix A expounds on the
matching process in greater detail and addresses potential concerns such as incorrect
matches (i.e. false positives or false negatives) in the data.

3.4

Summary Statistics

In Table 1, we present summary statistics of relevant variables for each level of local
government. We focus on the following variables: share of legislators running for
higher office in the next election, share of dynastic legislators (i.e. those with family
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relationships with any local politician12 or with the politician in higher office), term
and sex. The sample consists of the first and second place legislators in each level:
provincial board members, city councilors and village councilors. In each case, the
corresponding higher position is the provincial vice governor, city vice mayor and
village chair. In our sample, we see that 9-17% of councilors pursue higher office.
Considering general dynastic relationships, around 12-41% of legislators are related
to at least one local politician in the same period.13 Focusing on the specific dynastic
relationship of interest yields significantly lower shares. While city and village councilors are 2-6% dynastic, only 0.1% of provincial members are dynastic with respect
to the vice governor. Therefore, in regressions that include the dynasty variable, we
limit our analysis to the city and village levels. Across all levels, more legislators are
early on in their terms given that there is strong selection into reaching a second or
third term. Finally, we observe that while Philippine politics is male-dominated, it is
increasingly less so at lower levels of government, i.e. at the village level.

4

Identification Strategy

Establishing rank effects—the impact of rank on the probability of running or winning
in future elections—is necessary to show how political dynasties employ information
from elections. However, comparing first and second placers and their political out12

In calculating the share of dynastic legislators related to any local politician, I consider the
following positions: governor, vice governor, provincial board member, congressperson, mayor, vice
mayor and councilor. Note that for the village level, I only consider relationships between village
officials to avoid false matches.
13
The reason for the high number for provincial board members is due to their relationships with
city councilors. This is driven by the fact that I consider potential linkages with all cities under the
jurisdiction of that particular province (on average, provinces are composed of 20 cities). Removing
relationships with city councilors yields a more modest figure: 0.2181.
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comes presents an identification challenge and suffers from selection concerns. Candidates who finish first may garner the most votes due to social networks (Cruz et al.,
2017), resources (Gerber, 1998), innate ability (Mondak, 1995) and other factors (Lee,
2008; Ansolabehere et al., 2001). In this case, the ideal experiment is to get two otherwise similar individuals, randomly assign them the label of being first and second
and observe their eventual political decisions.
To mimic this design, we employ a two-pronged identification strategy that exploits a unique institutional feature of the Philippine local government and utilizes
the standard close elections regression discontinuity approach. First, we only consider elections for positions with at least two winners to guarantee that rank, not
incumbency or other extraneous factors, is driving our results.14 Second, following
the rank effects literature, we compare candidates who barely ranked first with those
who barely ranked second. This allows us to skirt around selection issues and compare
two individuals with ex ante similar characteristics.
For different levels of local government in the Philippines, we estimate the regression below at the provincial, city and village levels. In each scenario, politician i
refers to a provincial board member, city councilor or village councilor while position
p refers to the office of the provincial vice governor, city vice mayor or village chair,
14

Local legislative councils in the Philippines serve as an ideal laboratory to test rank effects
for two reasons. First, voters elect multiple councilors into the legislative council simultaneously,
guaranteeing both first and second placers to hold office at the same time. Second, councilors are
elected into the same position: having the same roles and responsibilities and differing only in rank.
These unique features allow us to compare two individuals both occupying the same office at the
same time, while only differing in their rank and underlying votes. This allows us to hold other
things constant, isolate the rank effect and parse out incumbency and other office-holding effects.
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respectively.
Candidacyipt+k = α + βF irstit +f (M Vit ) + F irstit × f (M Vit ) + it
Electionipt+k = α + βF irstit +f (M Vit ) + F irstit × f (M Vit ) + it

(1)

∀i s.t. M Vit ∈ [−h, h]
where Candidacyipt+k (Electionipt+k ) is 1 if politician i runs for (wins15 ) higher
office p in election year t + k, F irstit is 1 if politician i is ranked first (0 if ranked
second) in election year t, M Vit is the margin of victory between the first and second
placers and f (·) are linear, quadratic and cubic functions of the running variable.16
The optimal bandwidth value h is given by the bandwidth selection procedure used:
Calonico et al. (2014) and Imbens and Kalyanaraman (2012). Robust standard errors
are clustered at the level of the constituency: province for provincial board members,
city for city councilors and village for village councilors.
Given our interest in understanding the role of political dynasties, the succeeding
specification estimates the differential rank effects for dynasties and non-dynasties.
15

The Electionipt+k variable is defined as winning not conditional on running. Hence, the dummy
variable is equal to one when politician i wins, and zero if politician i loses or does not run for higher
office p.
16
Note that in general, we do not require i = p. To establish our main results, we let i be the
lower office which succeeds higher office p. In auxiliary regressions, we consider rank effects for when
i = p.
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That is, we estimate the following heterogeneous effects model:
Candidacyipt+k = α + βF irstit + γDynastyijt + δDynastyijt × F irstit + f (M Vit )+
F irstit × f (M Vit ) + Dynastyijt × f (M Vit ) + F irstit × Dynastyijt × f (M Vit ) + it
∀i s.t. M Vit ∈ [−h, h]
(2)
where Dynastyijt is 1 if politician i is related to the politician simultaneously
occupying office j in election year t, and the other variables are as defined above.
Note that it is possible for j 6= p, depending on the mechanism being tested. In other
robustness tests, we consider variables other than Dynastyijt to check for potential
heterogeneous effects.
The coefficient β now represents the rank effect for non-dynasties, and δ represents
the differential rank effect for dynasties relative to non-dynasties, i.e. the family first
effect. The sum β + δ yields the overall rank effect for dynasties. In the following
sections, we first test whether the family first effect exists: empirically, when δ 6= 0.
Next, we are also interested in its magnitude, i.e. whether β + δ = 0. In other words,
we examine whether the family first effect is large enough to undo the first place
effect. Estimating heterogeneous effects regressions allows us to investigate whether
dynasties respond to rank information differently from non-dynasties.
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Figure 3: First Place Effect

(a) Province

(b) City

(c) Village

Note: Horizontal axis shows the vote share difference between the first and second placers (i.e. a
positive vote margin implies ranking first and a negative vote margin implies ranking second). Each
circle (triangle) corresponds to the unconditional mean of running (winning) within 0.005 or 0.001
intervals of the vote margin. Solid curves are smoothed local polynomials on either side of the
discontinuity.

5
5.1

First Place Effect
Graphical Analysis

In this paper, first place effect refers to the increased probability of running or winning
of first placers relative to second placers due to their rank. Figure 3 shows the
existence of first place effects in all three levels of local government in the Philippines.
The x-axis variable, ‘vote share difference between first and second’, is equal to either
the first placer’s vote share minus the second placer’s vote share for the first placer
(which is positive and to the right of the cutoff), or the second placer’s vote share
minus the first placer’s vote share for the second placer (which is negative and to the
left of the cutoff). The y-axis is either the probability of running for (blue circles and
curves) or winning (red triangles and curves) the higher office in the next election.
Graphical analysis provides suggestive evidence of a discontinuous and large increase
in the probability of running for (and winning) the higher office for first placers
compared to second placers.
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5.2

Estimation Results

Table 2 presents estimated coefficients from Equation 1. The dependent variables are
either the probability of running for (Candidacy, t+k) or winning (Election, t+k) the
higher office—vice governor for the province, vice mayor for the city and village chair
for the village. Consistent with regression discontinuity designs, we show robustness
of results by varying our choice of the control function f (·) and the bandwidth h.
Columns 2 and 3 use the full sample and include quadratic and cubic functions of the
running variable. For specifications using optimal bandwidth procedures, Columns
5 and 7 estimate local linear regressions with the Calonico et al. (2014) and Imbens
and Kalyanaraman (2012) selection methods. Columns 4 and 6 provide the optimal
bandwidth value for the respective methods. To make sense of coefficient magnitudes,
Column 1 shows the second place mean, which is the estimated value of the dependent
variable for the close second placer.17 Finally, the number of observations is reported
in brackets.
Table 2 corroborates the graphical evidence: being labeled first versus second
significantly increases the probability of running and winning for all levels of government. First place effects on running for the provincial level range from 6.6-8.6% (from
a second placer’s baseline mean of 3.8%) while those on winning range from 1.9-3.8%
(from a base of 1.5%). City level coefficients are slightly smaller than the provincial
estimates: coefficients on running span from 4.9-6.8% (from a base of 10.4%) while
coefficients on winning go from 1.3-2.7% (from a base of 4.5%). For the village level,
the coefficients are in the same range as those for the city level: estimates for running
wander around 6.0-6.8% (from a base of 8.8%) and estimates for winning vary from
17

We follow the definition from Anagol and Fujiwara (2016), who use a linear specification and
the Imbens and Kalyanaraman (2012) bandwidth to compute for this mean.

0.033
[N =159,994]

0.088
[N =159,994]

0.045
[N =29,540]

0.104
[N =29,540]

0.015
[N =3,606]

0.038
[N =3,606]

0.0638∗∗∗
(0.00245)
0.0281∗∗∗
(0.00178)

0.0311∗∗∗
(0.00167)

0.0166∗∗∗
(0.00507)

0.0265∗∗∗
(0.00458)
0.0675∗∗∗
(0.00258)

0.0588∗∗∗
(0.00668)

0.0329∗∗∗
(0.0100)

0.0297∗∗∗
(0.00835)
0.0677∗∗∗
(0.00608)

0.0795∗∗∗
(0.0136)

Cubic
(3)

0.0779∗∗∗
(0.0113)

Quadratic
(2)

0.027
[N =136,422]

0.026
[N =135,946]

0.011
[N =22,204]

0.011
[N =22,356]

0.04
[N =2,696]

0.047
[N =2,838]

Optimal
Value
(4)

0.0277∗∗∗
(0.00210)

0.0619∗∗∗
(0.00298)

0.0156∗∗
(0.00617)

0.0559∗∗∗
(0.00805)

0.0379∗∗∗
(0.0119)

0.0861∗∗∗
(0.0146)

Linear
(5)

Bandwidth: CCT

0.008
[N =74,492]

0.009
[N =75,668]

0.006
[N =16,060]

0.007
[N =16,494]

0.012
[N =1,371]

0.016
[N =1,659]

Optimal
Value
(6)

0.0237∗∗∗
(0.00330)

0.0601∗∗∗
(0.00462)

0.0128
(0.00786)

0.0486∗∗∗
(0.00989)

0.0194
(0.0196)

0.0655∗∗
(0.0262)

Linear
(7)

Bandwidth: IK

Note: Robust standard errors clustered at the constituency level are in parentheses. Dependent variable is the probability of running
for or winning the higher office: vice governor for province, vice mayor for city and village chair for village regressions. The unit of
observation is a candidate. Columns 2-3 use the full sample with quadratic and cubic control functions. Column 5 uses the Calonico
et al. (2014) selection method while column 7 uses the Imbens and Kalyanaraman (2012) selection method. Columns 4 and 6 provide
the optimal value for each procedure. The number of observations for the full sample and bandwidth methods is reported in brackets.
Second place mean is the estimated value of the dependent variable for the second placer using the Imbens and Kalyanaraman (2012)
method. ***,** and * denote statistical significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent levels, respectively.

Election, t + k

Village
Candidacy, t + k

Election, t + k

City
Candidacy, t + k

Election, t + k

Province
Candidacy, t + k

Second Place
Mean
(1)

Full Sample

Table 2: First Place Effect
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2.4-3.1% (from a base of 3.3%).
The following are key observations from our empirical results. First, the estimated coefficients are stable, statistically significant and robust to using different
control functions and bandwidth selection methods. This holds for all levels of local
government.18 Second, the coefficients are economically meaningful. For example,
the provincial estimates show a doubling of a candidate’s propensity to run simply
by labeling him/her first. While not as large, city and village level estimates show a
50-70% increase in this probability. These numbers are substantial and show how impactful being labeled first is on a candidate’s decision to run for higher office. Third,
estimates on the probability of running are two to three times larger than estimates
on the probability of winning. Although by construction, βrun > βwin , the magnitude
of the difference is much larger than was documented in previous literature (Anagol
and Fujiwara, 2016). This shows that while ranking first leads to large effects on
running, this does not translate to a sizeable effect on winning. To be more precise,
we consider how much of the increased effect on winning is due to the higher probability of running. In Appendix B, we formalize this idea and compute for bounds
on the effects on winning, conditional on running. The exercise shows bounds that
are indistinguishable from zero such that we cannot conclude a clear effect on winning conditional on running.19 In other words, the results suggest that the effects on
winning are being mechanically driven by effects on running, and that conditional on
running for higher office, first placers are as likely as second placers to win. Following
18

An exception to this is the estimates on winning from the Imbens and Kalyanaraman (2012)
linear specification for the provincial and city levels.
19
All lower and upper bounds are indistinguishable from zero, except for the village upper bound.
This is unlike the estimates in Anagol and Fujiwara (2016) where they document significant conditional effects on winning (i.e. both lower and upper bounds were significantly greater than zero).
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these results, we therefore limit our discussions to first place effects on candidacy in
the succeeding sections.

5.3

Robustness Checks

Covariate Balance | As an indirect test of our identification assumption, we
check whether first and second placers differ on predetermined variables. Graphical
evidence shows that covariates are smooth around the cutoff point (see Figure 4).
Table 3 presents results for regressions with the following as the dependent variable:
probability of running and winning, vote share, membership in the ruling party (i.e.
president’s party) and dynastic status in the previous election. Reassuringly, all variables are balanced.

Robustness to Bandwidths | Figure C1 shows how our coefficient estimates on
candidacy and election vary with the chosen bandwidth value. For a wide range of
values, our estimates are relatively stable and remain statistically significant for all
levels of government. As expected, results on running are more robust to bandwidth
values than the results on winning. While our earlier tables presented estimates using only the optimal bandwidth, this exercise proves that for many other values, our
results continue to hold.

Identifying Politicians | Given that our data does not include politician identifiers, we identify politicians across time by matching names. A potential issue is
that our results may be affected by name mismatches. For example, without the
suffix name, we may consider both father/uncle and son as one, potentially causing
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Figure 4: Covariate Balance
— Province —

(a) Run & Win, t − k

(b) Vote Share, t − k

(c) President’s Party, t − k

— City —

(d) Run & Win, t − k

(e) Vote Share, t − k

(f) President’s Party, t − k

(g) Dynasty, t − k

— Village —

(h) Run & Win, t − k

(i) Vote Share, t − k

(j) Dynasty, t − k

Note: Horizontal axis shows the vote margin of the first placer. Dependent variables are the probability of running for or winning the higher office, vote shares, party affiliation and dynastic status
in the previous election. Each circle or triangle corresponds to the unconditional mean within 0.005
or 0.001 intervals of the vote margin. Solid curves are smoothed local polynomials on either side of
the discontinuity.
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Table 3: Placebo Test and Covariate Balance
Bandwidth: CCT

Bandwidth: IK

Second Place
Mean
(1)

Optimal
Value
(2)

Linear
(3)

Optimal
Value
(4)

Linear
(5)

Province
Candidacy, t − k

0.015

0.04
[N =2,708]

-0.00617
(0.00723)

0.019
[N =1,846]

-0.0147
(0.00960)

Election, t − k

0.002

0.048
[N =2,880]

-0.000461
(0.00304)

0.018
[N =1,760]

-0.000388
(0.00396)

Vote Share, t − k

0.218

0.051
[N =2,110]

0.0134
(0.0157)

0.029
[N =1,668]

0.00639
(0.0186)

President’s Party, t − k

0.423

0.055
[N =2,104]

-0.00778
(0.0304)

0.019
[N =1,285]

0.00764
(0.0415)

City
Candidacy, t − k

0.035

0.033
[N =22,044]

-0.00159
(0.00446)

0.006
[N =15,874]

-0.00495
(0.00563)

Election, t − k

0.006

0.014
[N =24,466]

0.000066
(0.00181)

0.006
[N =13,536]

0.000514
(0.00273)

Vote Share, t − k

0.132

0.014
[N =15,571]

0.00479
(0.00505)

0.007
[N =10,703]

0.00267
(0.00666)

President’s Party, t − k

0.35

0.012
[N =13,419]

0.00222
(0.0122)

0.011
[N =12,703]

0.00173
(0.0128)

Dynasty, t − k

0.005

0.009
[N =20,320]

-0.00181
(0.00169)

0.007
[N =16,908]

-0.00156
(0.00187)

Village
Candidacy, t − k

0.044

0.019
[N =71,226]

0.000201
(0.00265)

0.007
[N =41,514]

0.00286
(0.00395)

Election, t − k

0.009

0.015
[N =65,088]

-0.000481
(0.00138)

0.004
[N =27,690]

-0.00162
(0.00254)

Vote Share, t − k

0.10

0.014
[N =40,774]

-0.00118
(0.00187)

0.004
[N =18,248]

-0.00282
(0.00321)

Dynasty, t − k

0.012

0.017
[N =69,170]

0.000845
(0.00151)

0.006
[N =36,798]

-0.00152
(0.00236)

Note: Robust standard errors clustered at the constituency level are in parentheses. Dependent
variables are the probability of running for or winning the higher office, vote shares, party affiliation
and dynastic status in the previous election. The unit of observation is a candidate. Second place
mean is the estimated value of the dependent variable for the second placer using the Imbens and
Kalyanaraman (2012) method. ***,** and * denote statistical significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent
levels, respectively.
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overestimates to the first place effect. To address this and other possible sources of
mismatch, we perform two checks. First, we use more stringent matching techniques,
where in addition to matching first and last names, we also match the suffix name,
the middle initial or the middle name. Tables A2, A3 and A4 show that our results
are robust to these matching techniques. Second, we identify the most common last
names and drop observations with those last names. The idea behind the test is that
mismatches occur more frequently in individuals with less unique last names. Again,
our results are robust to this exercise (see Table A5).

5.4

Other Results

Other Rank Effects | The paper focuses on first place effects, although there are
other ranks for which the same analysis can be made. For example, in the 7-member
village council, we can study rank effects comparing second and third placers, up
until sixth and seventh placers. In Appendix D, we show rank effects between nth
and n + 1th placers for n > 1. Effects see a sharp drop after n = 1: that is, first place
effects for running are significantly greater than other rank effects. The difference
is sizeable such that the other rank effects are mostly statistically indistinguishable
from each other. Estimates for other ranks either have small magnitudes or are not
statistically different from zero. The size of the constituency seems to matter for the
presence of other rank effects: for the provincial level, only the first place effect exists;
for the city level, two other rank effects are present; for the village level, all but one
rank effects are positive and significant.

Incumbency Effect | To make sense of the magnitudes of the first place effect, we
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compare it with the incumbency effect: the effect of barely winning on running for
or winning the same or higher position in the next election. Incumbency effects subsume rank effects, in that it incorporates an additional effect—that of holding office.
Previously, we compared two candidates who were both elected into office, although
with different ranks. For incumbency, in addition to comparing ranks, we also compare the candidate who barely won (rank n) with the candidate who barely lost (rank
n + 1), which implies that the former assumes political office whereas the latter does
not. We perform two tests: (i) the incumbency effect on promotion (effect of incumbency on running for/winning the higher position) and the (ii) classic incumbency
effect (effect of incumbency on running for/winning the same position again).20 For
this test we change the way we construct our sample: we only take councilors whose
rank is the lowest among the winners and those whose rank is the highest among the
losers. In the village level, since all village councils have exactly seven councilors, we
only include the seventh and eighth councilors in our sample. We do the the same
for the province and city levels. Table E1 shows the presence of incumbency effects
on promotion: holding office (and ranking higher) leads to an increase in the probability of running for higher office. However, these effects (in levels) are significantly
smaller than the estimates in Table 2.21 Looking at Table E2, we find sizeable and
significant estimates of the classic incumbency effect (both in levels and percentage of
base). Altogether, these results seem to suggest that incumbency affects one’s plans
for re-election, but not one’s aspirations for holding higher office (or at least not to
20

Formally, the incumbency effect on promotion is tested when p is the higher executive office
(vice mayor) and i is the legislative position (councilor) in Equation 1, while the classic incumbency
effect is when i = p.
21
Considering the base mean of the lower ranked candidate, the coefficients appear economically
significant. This is because the second place mean in Table 2 is around an order of magnitude higher
than the lower rank mean in Table E1.

95

the same degree). The reason underlying this is that in order to test incumbency in
our setting, it requires choosing the lower ranked candidates (since councils tend to
have 5, 8, 7 members in the province, city and village, respectively). Combining this
with our other rank results, we surmise that incumbency, more than rank, plays a
significant role in promotion for lower ranked politicians.

Other Positions | Are there rank effects for running and winning again for the
same position? So far, we have centered our discussion on rank effects on political
promotion, where ending up in a higher rank leads to running for a higher position.22
We explore the case when i = p in Equation 1 and estimate the same regressions.
Table F1 shows that rank effects are negative when considering the same position:
first placers are less likely than second placers to run for and win the same position
in the following election. This suggests that being labeled first makes the politician
aspire for higher positions and in effect, relinquish his/her current office and not seek
re-election.

6

Family First Effect

6.1

Graphical Analysis

In this section, we introduce the family first effect: being related to the politician
occupying the higher office (hence belonging to a political dynasty) reverses the first
22

We base our definition of the ‘higher position’ on the constitutional rule of succession. For
example, when city vice mayors vacate their position, the highest ranking councilor replaces the vice
mayor.
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Figure 5: Family First Effect

(a) City

(b) Village

Note: Horizontal axis shows the vote margin of the first placer relative to the second placer (i.e. a
positive vote margin implies ranking first and a negative vote margin implies ranking second). Each
circle or triangle corresponds to the unconditional mean of the probability of running for higher
office within 0.001 intervals of the vote margin. Solid curves are smoothed local polynomials on
either side of the discontinuity.

place effect.23 Figure 5 depicts this scenario for the city and village levels.24 The
horizontal axis is the same as in previous figures. The vertical axis variable is now
the probability of running for higher office in the next election.25 The blue circles
(red triangles) represent the unconditional mean of the y-axis variable for dynasties
(non-dynasties) in each bin. Graphical evidence shows that while the first place effect
is still present for non-dynasties (i.e. there is a discontinuous jump in probabilities for
the red curve), the same is not true for dynasties (i.e. blue curves are smooth around
23

Note that the definition of political dynasties here is more specific than is in the literature.
Instead of considering relationships with any local position, we focus our discussion on relationships
with specific positions that are relevant to each test. We also limit ourselves to horizontal dynasties:
concurrent family relationships across different positions at the same time. In particular, we consider
the relationship of the vice mayor and city councilor (or village chair and village councilor), both
of whom were elected at year t. The dependent variable is as before, the probability of running for
higher office (vice mayor or village chair) at year t + k.
24
In this and the succeeding sections, we exclude the provincial level analysis given the lack of
variation in family relationships, which leads to our inability to show this result.
25
Given that there are no or weak conditional effects of candidacy, we do not discuss them further.
See Appendix B for a more extensive discussion.
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the cutoff or even lower on the right side). This presents prima facie evidence that
families, with their dynastic qualities, can undo the impact of the first place effect.

6.2

Estimation Results

Estimated coefficients from Equation 2 are shown in Table 4. The outcome variable
Candidacyipt+k is the probability of running for higher office p in election year t + k—
vice mayor for the city and village chair for the village. The dynasty variable is
an indicator for whether the city (village) councilor is related to the incumbent city
vice mayor (village chair) at election year t.26 The coefficients of interest are the
following: (i) F irstit , the first place effect for non-dynasties, (ii) Dynastyijt , the
level shift in candidacy for dynastic second placers, and (iii) F irstit × Dynastyijt ,
the marginal effect on candidacy for dynastic first placers. Summing up F irstit and
F irstit × Dynastyijt yields the first place effect of dynasties. To show robustness of
results, we vary our choice of the control function f (·) and the bandwidth h. Using
the full sample, Columns 1 and 2 include quadratic and cubic functions of the running
variable, respectively. Columns 3 and 4 perform local linear regressions using optimal
bandwidth approaches: Calonico et al. (2014) and Imbens and Kalyanaraman (2012).
Finally, we test whether the first place effect for dynasties is zero, and report the
corresponding F -statistic and p-value.
Table 4 supports the graphical evidence: dynasties reverse or dampen first place
effects. First, we note that the first place effect for non-dynasties is still large and
statistically significant. Second, we see that the coefficient on F irstit × Dynastyijt is
negative and statistically significant for both city and village level regressions. This
26

Note that the relationship between the two political offices must be within the same constituency
and same election period.
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empirically proves the existence of the family first effect, showing that for dynasties,
the first place effect is attenuated. Third, we check whether this attenuation simply
suppresses the first place effect for dynasties or reverses it completely. We formally
test whether the sum of the coefficients on F irstit and F irstit × Dynastyijt equals
zero. For the city level, we see a complete reversal of the first place effect while for
the village level, the effect seems to diminish as the bandwidth decreases.27

6.3

Robustness Checks

McCrary Density Test | Figure 6 depicts the density of candidates for dynasties
and non-dynasties. We plot the distribution of candidates to check whether there are
irregularities around the cutoff.28 The graphs look balanced, and the formal McCrary
(2008) test also supports this. For the city level, the p-value for the dynastic (nondynastic) sample is 0.8680 (0.9293). For the village level, the p-value for the dynastic
(non-dynastic) sample is 0.4650 (0.7109). Overall, this implies that in both dynastic
and non-dynastic samples, there are no significant differences in the density around
the cutoff.

Covariate Balance | As an additional placebo test, we check whether first and
second placers are equally likely to be dynastic in the past. Otherwise, this potentially raises some concerns about how being dynastic in the past affects a politician’s
decision to run and win in the future. Table 3 and Figure 4 show that along with
27

In the full sample, the effect is merely reduced, but in the Imbens and Kalyanaraman (2012)
sample, the effect disappears entirely.
28
Note however that this does not necessarily invalidate our identification strategy. This can
only show whether imbalances in the number of dynastic candidates (and not an inherent dynastic
quality) can explain our results.
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Table 4: Family First Effect
Full Sample

Optimal Bandwidth

Quadratic
Cubic
Linear
Linear
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
City: Councilor Running for & Related to Vice Mayor
First
0.0684∗∗∗ 0.0641∗∗∗
0.0648∗∗∗
0.0573∗∗∗
(0.00796) (0.00917)
(0.00947)
(0.0115)
Dynasty

-0.0466∗
(0.0276)

-0.0282
(0.0307)

-0.0401
(0.0382)

-0.0257
(0.0429)

First × Dynasty

-0.0855∗∗
(0.0364)
0.23
0.63
0.118
1
26,202

-0.105∗∗
(0.0414)
1.02
0.31
0.118
1
26,202

-0.101∗∗
(0.0502)
0.54
0.46
0.118
CCT=0.010
19,158

-0.121∗∗
(0.0572)
1.30
0.26
0.118
IK=0.006
14,084

F -statistic
p-value
Second Place Mean
Bandwidth
N

Village: Councilor Running for & Related to Village Chair
First
0.0682∗∗∗ 0.0650∗∗∗
0.0633∗∗∗
0.0577∗∗∗
(0.00236) (0.00251)
(0.00305)
(0.00531)
Dynasty

0.0109∗
(0.00598)

0.0105
(0.00698)

0.00864
(0.00848)

0.0364∗∗
(0.0157)

First × Dynasty

-0.0187∗∗
(0.00941)
29.66
0.00
0.088
1
159,994

-0.0184∗
(0.0110)
18.93
0.00
0.088
1
159,994

-0.0297∗∗
(0.0130)
7.06
0.01
0.088
CCT=0.027
136,854

-0.0471∗∗
(0.0234)
0.21
0.64
0.088
IK=0.007
64,216

F -statistic
p-value
Second Place Mean
Bandwidth
N

Note: Robust standard errors clustered at the constituency level are in parentheses.
Dependent variable is the probability of running for a higher office. The dynasty
variable is an indicator for whether the councilor is related to the incumbent vice
mayor (city) or village chair (village). The unit of observation is a candidate. Columns
1-2 use the full sample with quadratic and cubic control functions. Column 3 uses
the Calonico et al. (2014) selection method while column 4 uses the Imbens and
Kalyanaraman (2012) selection method. Second place mean is the estimated value
of the dependent variable for the second placer using the Imbens and Kalyanaraman
(2012) method. The reported F -statistic and p-value are from the test of the sum of
coefficients, First and First × Dynasty. ***,** and * denote statistical significance
at the 1, 5 and 10 percent levels, respectively.
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Figure 6: McCrary Density Test

(a) City

(b) Village

Note: Horizontal axis shows the vote margin of the first placer relative to the second placer (i.e.
a positive vote margin implies ranking first and a negative vote margin implies ranking second).
Each circle (triangle) corresponds to the number of dynastic (non-dynastic) candidates within 0.001
intervals of the vote margin.

other variables, past dynastic status is smooth around the threshold. In Table G1,
we also test whether city-level variables are balanced for dynastic and non-dynastic
areas. Although dynastic areas seem to be smaller, only the population difference is
significant.29

Identifying Dynastic Relations | The results from this section rely heavily on
the identification of dynasties from the data. Given that our data does not include
explicit family links, we exploit the naming convention in the Philippines to infer
family relationships. Appendix A discusses the potential issues in using this method.
To address this, we drop individuals bearing the most common last names frrom our
sample to minimize the possibility of incorrect dynasty relationships. Table A6 shows
that our results are robust to the exclusion of these individuals.
29

To address this potential issue, we include population as a control in the regression and find
that results remain unchanged (see Table G2).
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7

Mechanism: Internal Family Stability

The previous sections have documented robust evidence for the first place effect for
Philippine legislators at the city and village levels. We have also shown that family
relations between city (village) councilors and vice mayors (village chairs) fully counteract the rank effect. These results suggest that political dynasties are, on average,
not influenced by rank information. This sets them apart from conventional political
actors such as parties and voters. In this section, we provide evidence for internal
dynastic stability as the mechanism that links family ties and the absence of rank
effects.
While we are unable to capture this directly, we provide empirical support consistent with stability norms. In particular, we leverage the extant literature and provide
suggestive evidence that hierarchy and patriarchy are two rules that family members
abide by to maintain internal order. We first test hierarchy by exploiting the existence of term limits in the Philippines: any elective position in local government has
a limit of three consecutive terms. When a politician is term limited, he/she cannot
run for the same office, and has two options: run for another office or sit out the
current election and run after one term has lapsed.
Term limits are ideal for testing our mechanism for various reasons. First, term
limits are a real binding constraint for politicians seeking reelection or election into
higher office. The Philippine Constitution is clear about limiting politicians from
‘overstaying’ and it is monitored and enforced by relevant authorities. Second, term
limits curb a politician’s ability to perpetuate one’s self, thereby emphasizing the
role of succession in undermining such restrictions. Last, given the fixed nature of
term limits, politicians can respond strategically by planning their decisions around
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them. This argues that politicians are not merely reacting to stochastic events (i.e.
accidents such as deaths), but are actually able to plan their political horizon.
The hierarchy norm implies that when the dynastic politician occupying the higher
office (vice mayor or village chair) is term limited, his/her relative in the lower office (councilor) will naturally step up to fill this future vacancy. When the dynastic
councilor is term limited, he/she has a stronger incentive to seek higher office. Our
hypothesis is that when politicians are term limited, the family first effect should vanish. Consistent with the idea of hierarchy, families, when met with term limits, will
strategically assign a replacement for the politician in higher office. However, families
do not simply send any replacement: they promote their next best candidates—first
placers. This implies that when term limits bind, the first place effect remains significant for dynasties. Conversely, when dynasties are not term limited, the family first
effect should still hold. Dynastic politicians will stay in office, effectively constraining
other family members from seeking higher office, until the term limit is reached. They
are then forced to vacate their office, and strategically relinquish their place to their
designated relatives.
To show this empirically, we estimate a ‘triple-difference’ specification interacting
rank, dynasty and term limits to explore how term limits matter for the family first
effect. Incorporating the third difference allows us to compare the family first effect
for term limited and non-term limited samples. First, we consider the sample where
hierarchy is most compelling: when both incumbent politicians are simultaneously
term limited. Second, in the remaining sample, we consider cases when either one
or both politicians are not term limited. We then test whether the effects show
the correct signs on both subsamples and check whether the estimates from each
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subsample are significantly different from each other.30 We estimate the following
regression:

Candidacyipt+k = α + βF irstit + γDynastyijt + τ T ermijt + δDynastyijt × F irstit +
µT ermijt × F irstit + νDynastyijt × T ermijt + ρDynastyijt × F irstit × T ermijt +
f (M Vit ) + F irstit × f (M Vit ) + Dynastyijt × f (M Vit ) + T ermijt × f (M Vit ) +
F irstit × Dynastyijt × f (M Vit ) + F irstit × T ermijt × f (M Vit ) +
T ermijt × Dynastyijt × f (M Vit ) + Dynastyijt × F irstit × T ermijt × f (M Vit ) + it
∀i s.t. M Vit ∈ [−h, h]
(3)
where T ermijt is 1 if both politicians i and j are term limited in election year t,
and the other variables are as defined above. In this case, politician j is the village
chair and politician i is the village councilor. The coefficient δ now represents the
family first effect for non-term limited politicians while the coefficient ρ represents the
differential family first effect for term limited politicians relative to their non-term
limited counterparts. The sum ρ + δ yields the overall family first effect for term
limited politicians.
Consistent with our hypotheses above, we find that in Table 5, the family first
effect for term limited politicians are now positive. This implies that when both
the village chair and councilor are term limited, incentives for succession are strong.
Dynasties, instead of constraining the councilor from running, are now pushing them
30

Given the different cuts in the data this test requires, we limit our test to the village level where
we have sufficient observations to obtain precise estimates.
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Table 5: Hierarchical Norms
Full Sample

Optimal Bandwidth

Quadratic
(1)
0.0667∗∗∗
(0.00235)

Cubic
(2)
0.0635∗∗∗
(0.0025)

Linear
(3)
0.0618∗∗∗
(0.00304)

Linear
(4)
0.0567∗∗∗
(0.00527)

0.0118∗∗
(0.00594)

0.0116∗
(0.00692)

0.00908
(0.00843)

0.0332∗∗
(0.0155)

0.268∗∗∗
(0.026)

0.260∗∗∗
(0.0323)

0.278∗∗∗
(0.0257)

0.268∗∗∗
(0.0438)

First × Dynasty

-0.0213∗∗
(0.00933)

-0.0220∗∗
(0.0109)

-0.0344∗∗∗
(0.0129)

-0.0500∗∗
(0.0230)

Dynasty × Term

-0.102
(0.0935)

-0.139
(0.123)

-0.0785
(0.101)

0.0202
(0.174)

First × Term

0.0161
(0.0369)

0.0608
(0.0463)

0.0441
(0.0365)

0.0253
(0.0628)

First × Dynasty × Term

0.334∗∗
(0.14)
0.091
1
159,994

0.532∗∗∗
(0.17)
0.091
1
159,994

0.388∗∗∗
(0.141)
0.091
CCT=.027
136,590

0.299
(0.240)
.091
IK=.007
64,488

First
Dynasty
Term Limited

Second Place Mean
Bandwidth
N

Note: Robust standard errors clustered at the village level are in parentheses. Dependent
variable is the probability of running for village chair. Term limited is an indicator for
whether both the village chair and councilor are term limited. The unit of observation is
a candidate. Columns 1-2 use the full sample with quadratic and cubic control functions.
Column 3 uses the Calonico et al. (2014) selection method while column 4 uses the Imbens
and Kalyanaraman (2012) selection method. Second place mean is the estimated value of
the dependent variable for the second placer using the Imbens and Kalyanaraman (2012)
method. ***,** and * denote statistical significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent levels,
respectively.
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to pursue higher office to replace the senior member who is barred from seeking
reelection. The result is generally robust, and the coefficients on the triple interaction
(ρ) and the sum (ρ + δ) are positive and statistically significant. In addition, the
economic magnitudes are sizeable: the family first effect is now three to four times
larger than the original first place effect. This hints at the significant role that term
limits play in urging dynasties, concerned with longevity, to map out succession plans
consistent with established norms. Contrary to the earlier result, our findings show
that when the village chair and councilor are not both term limited, the family first
effect remains negative and robust. This is consistent with the idea that dynastic
politicians remain in office as long as possible, until they are ‘forced’ to run for other
office when their term limits bind. The results suggest that dynasties vary their
strategies based on family hierarchy: higher ranked councilors replace the chair when
the latter is term-limited, but wait in line while the latter finishes his/her term.
We next test for patriarchal norms. As argued for previously, Philippine politics
is male-dominated, and female politicians are often placeholders for male members
of the family. Female politicians are more likely to serve as benchwarmers; they are
more likely to be replaced by a male member of the family. These strategic choices
represent actions consistent with stability and coordination within the family.
To test the existence of gender norms, we again estimate a ‘triple-difference’ specification interacting rank, dynasty and sex. Our sex variable is defined as whether
the village chair is female and the councilor is male or otherwise. We split our sample
this way because this highlights a strong preference for male leaders. Formally, we estimate a regression similar to Equation 3, but substitute Sexijt for T ermijt . If gender
norms are indeed present in our context, we expect the triple-difference coefficient to
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Table 6: Patriarchal Norms
Full Sample

Optimal Bandwidth

Quadratic
(1)
0.0676∗∗∗
(0.00255)

Cubic
(2)
0.0643∗∗∗
(0.0027)

Linear
(3)
0.0625∗∗∗
(0.0033)

Linear
(4)
0.0571∗∗∗
(0.00572)

Dynasty

0.00933
(0.00645)

0.00989
(0.00746)

0.0117
(0.00901)

0.0365∗∗
(0.0172)

Sex

0.000975
(0.004)

-0.000773
(0.00456)

0.00249
(0.00533)

-0.000876
(0.00958)

First × Dynasty

-0.0260∗∗
(0.0108)

-0.0367∗∗∗
(0.012)

-0.0397∗∗∗
(0.0138)

-0.0482∗
(0.0248)

Dynasty × Sex

-0.000889
(0.0201)

-0.00255
(0.023)

-0.0218
(0.0253)

-0.0159
(0.0415)

First × Sex

-0.00102
(0.00707)

-0.00226
(0.00798)

0.00327
(0.00865)

-0.000451
(0.0150)

First × Dynasty × Sex

0.0591∗∗
(0.03)
0.091
1
159,958

0.0782∗∗
(0.0349)
0.091
1
159,958

0.0782∗
(0.0401)
0.091
CCT=.027
136,556

0.0286
(0.0739)
0.091
IK=.007
64,484

First

Second Place Mean
Bandwidth
N

Note: Robust standard errors clustered at the village level are in parentheses. Dependent
variable is the probability of running for village chair. Sex is an indicator for whether
the village chair is female and councilor is male. The unit of observation is a candidate.
Columns 1-2 use the full sample with quadratic and cubic control functions. Column
3 uses the Calonico et al. (2014) selection method while column 4 uses the Imbens and
Kalyanaraman (2012) selection method. Second place mean is the estimated value of
the dependent variable for the second placer using the Imbens and Kalyanaraman (2012)
method. ***,** and * denote statistical significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent levels,
respectively.
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be positive. Table 6 corroborates this claim and shows that having a female leader
and a male subordinate results in larger first place effects for dynasties. In other
words, dynasties are more likely to let a male subordinate replace the politician in
higher office when the latter is female.31 The magnitudes are statistically significant
and robust, although they are smaller than the term limit results. This suggests that
while gender norms favor men in positions of leadership, term limits seem to be more
binding given its constitutional restrictions.
The results for both hierarchical and patriarchal norms suggest that families operate according to rules that prioritize internal stability. By establishing this norm,
political dynasties focus less on the signal inherent in a candidate’s rank. As a result,
political dynasties strategically assign their family members to different positions of
power, across different periods in time. The existence of rank effects, coupled with
norms of internal stability, allows political families to persist.

8

Alternative Mechanism & Explanations

8.1

Political Party

Political parties are formal organizations whose function is, among other things, to
coordinate action among its members (Aldrich, 1995). One way parties coordinate
their members is to decide whom among its members to field in any given election. If
politicians allied with political parties toe the party line, then similar results as the
family first effect may accrue. In particular, when political dynasties are more likely
to belong to the same party, then it is possible that party coordination, not dynastic
31

This is in contrast to comparison groups where either the head is male, or when both politicians
are female.
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relationships, is driving our results.
First, it is important to note that village elections are non-partisan. Village candidates cannot be allied with any formal political party, or else they may face sanctions
by the local election authorities. That family first effects are present despite parties
being non-existent at the village level is suggestive of the minimal (if any) role that
parties play in counteracting rank information.32
Figure 7: Party Coordination (City)

(a) Party Similarity

(b) Independent

Note: Horizontal axis shows the vote share difference between the first and second placers (i.e. a
positive vote margin implies ranking first and a negative vote margin implies ranking second). Each
circle (triangle) corresponds to the unconditional mean of running for councilor-vice mayor pairs
who are in the same party (different parties) within 0.001 intervals of the vote margin. Solid curves
are smoothed local polynomials on either side of the discontinuity.

Second, we test potential coordination by political parties by estimating Equation
2 and replacing the Dynastyijt variable with SameP artyijt , which is an indicator for
whether the city councilor belongs to the same party as the vice mayor. Figure 7 and
Table 7 show that this mechanism is unlikely the driving force behind the family first
effect since the interaction term is not statistically significant in any specification. An
32

In fact, Folke et al. (2016) find that parties respond to rank information when making decisions
about promotion.
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Table 7: Party Coordination
Full Sample

Optimal Bandwidth

Quadratic
Cubic
Linear
(1)
(2)
(3)
Councilor & Vice Mayor in the Same Party
First
0.0754∗∗∗ 0.0717∗∗∗
0.0689∗∗∗
(0.0108)
(0.0128)
(0.0144)

Linear
(4)
0.0528∗∗∗
(0.0179)

-0.0343∗∗∗
(0.00914)

-0.0307∗∗∗
(0.0108)

-0.0300∗∗
(0.0119)

-0.0489∗∗∗
(0.0151)

-0.0152
(0.0146)
0.118
1
26,202

-0.0163
(0.0173)
0.118
1
26,202

-0.0121
(0.0190)
0.118
CCT=0.010
19,124

0.00626
(0.0241)
0.118
IK=0.006
13,522

Councilor as Independent
First
0.0675∗∗∗
(0.00831)

0.0636∗∗∗
(0.00955)

0.0645∗∗∗
(0.0100)

0.0573∗∗∗
(0.0124)

Same Party
First × Same Party
Second Place Mean
Bandwidth
N

Independent

-0.0110
(0.0137)

-0.00639
(0.0162)

-0.00560
(0.0184)

-0.00591
(0.0232)

First × Independent

0.000342
(0.0220)
0.118
1
26,181

-0.00780
(0.0249)
0.118
1
26,181

-0.0136
(0.0291)
0.118
CCT=0.010
19,108

-0.00710
(0.0354)
0.118
IK=0.006
13,512

Second Place Mean
Bandwidth
N

Note: Robust standard errors clustered at the city level are in parentheses. Dependent variable is the probability of running for vice mayor. The party variable is an
indicator for whether the councilor is in the same party as the incumbent vice mayor.
The independent variable is an indicator for whether the councilor registered as an
independent. The unit of observation is a candidate. Columns 1-2 use the full sample
with quadratic and cubic control functions. Column 3 uses the Calonico et al. (2014)
selection method while column 4 uses the Imbens and Kalyanaraman (2012) selection
method. Second place mean is the estimated value of the dependent variable for the
second placer using the Imbens and Kalyanaraman (2012) method. ***,** and * denote
statistical significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent levels, respectively.
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interesting result is that political parties seem to be able to coordinate action among
its members, but not sufficient to reverse the first place effect. To be precise, being
in the same party constrains first and second placers from running for the higher
position, although it is a level effect impacting both councilors equally. The effect
size, ranging fom 3-5% decrease in candidacy is also smaller than the family first
effect (9-12%) we documented in the previous section.
Third, we perform another test of party coordination which is more general in the
sense that we do not restrict to specific party relationships. Underlying this test is
the idea that parties may form coalitions and that the right comparison is between
candidates with and without alliances (regardless of the party). Following this logic,
our empirical test compares whether rank effects dissipate or intensify for candidates
who registered as independents. Similar to the previous test, we estimate Equation
2 and replace the Dynastyijt variable with Independentijt , which is an indicator for
whether the city councilor is an independent or not (allied with some party). In the
same table, we see that rank effects do not differ for allied and independent candidates.
Altogether, the results do not support a party explanation where party alignment,
not dynastic status, dictates political behavior of its members. This is consistent with
existing literature highlighting the inability of political parties to coordinate action
among politicians in developing countries in general (Mainwaring and Scully, 1995)
and the Philippines in particular (Hicken, 2009).

8.2

Voter Coordination

Voters may also play a role in strategically coordinating towards their preferred candidate. Anagol and Fujiwara (2016) show that voters, in order to beat the incumbent,
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coordinate away from third (or lower) placed candidates and towards the runner-up.
In our case, voters may coordinate against established families, and political dynasties may then constrain their members from seeking higher office. Hence, our results
might not arise from family norms, but may be a result of dynasties strategically
responding to voters’ coordinated action. First, we argue that voters do not seem
to be successful in coordinating towards a particular candidate. The most straightforward result of effective voter coordination is for the first place candidate to win,
although this is not applicable in our case. While first placers are more likely to run,
they do not seem to be more likely to win higher office. This reflects a trivial role
voters play in our setting as compared to Anagol and Fujiwara (2016). However, it is
possible that political actors respond not to the very act of coordination, but only to
the mere expectation of it. We test this indirectly by comparing the first place effect
in areas where voter coordination may have greater impacts on politicians’ decision
making. That is, we consider how places with higher voter turnout, by intensifying
any coordination efforts, affect the first place effect. Table 8 shows that the first place
effect does not differ heterogeneously with respect to voter turnout. The coefficients
on voter turnout and its interaction with rank are not statistically significant and
relatively small (in absolute value).

8.3

Candidate Selection and Ability

Recent literature on political dynasties has highlighted the fact that dynastic politicians might be of lower quality than their non-dynastic counterparts (George, 2019).
If this holds in our setting, then it is possible that the reason behind dynasties’ reluctance to seek higher office is not because of prevailing norms but due to lower
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Table 8: Voter Coordination
Full Sample

Optimal Bandwidth

Quadratic
(1)

Cubic
(2)

Linear
(3)

Linear
(4)

0.0557∗∗∗
(0.0169)

0.0398∗∗∗
(0.0193)

0.0522∗∗∗
(0.0195)

0.0429∗
(0.0236)

Voter Turnout

-0.0204
(0.0130)

-0.0217
(0.0153)

-0.00629
(0.0168)

-0.00962
(0.0202)

First × Voter Turnout

-0.00910
(0.0215)
0.116
1
13,148

-0.000685
-0.0144
(0.0245)
(0.0266)
0.116
0.116
1
CCT=0.010
13,148
9,720

City
First

Second Place Mean
Bandwidth
N

-0.0250
(0.0315)
0.116
IK=0.006
7,104

Note: Robust standard errors clustered at the constituency level are in parentheses.
Dependent variable is the probability of running for vice mayor. The voter turnout
variable is an indicator for above median voter turnout defined as the share of actual to
registered voters. The unit of observation is a candidate. Columns 1-2 use the full sample
with quadratic and cubic control functions. Column 3 uses the Calonico et al. (2014)
selection method while column 4 uses the Imbens and Kalyanaraman (2012) selection
method. Second place mean is the estimated value of the dependent variable for the
second placer using the Imbens and Kalyanaraman (2012) method. ***,** and * denote
statistical significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent levels, respectively.

politician quality, broadly construed. Less competent politicians may be less likely
to run for office due to lower perceived chances of winning for those candidates. We
argue that this is unlikely true in our case for three reasons. First, the ability hypothesis is inconsistent with our term limit result when interpreting general politician
ability as an inherent, time-invariant quality. If dynasties are indeed worse, why are
they more likely to run when they reach their term limit? The sudden switch in the
decision to run—from less likely to more likely—as a result of the term limit suggests
that time-invariant ability might not play a significant role in our context.33 Second,
33
Even when considering the possibility of ability changing over time, the sudden shift in the
decision to run when term limited does not seem to realistically reflect an abrupt improvement in a
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to more directly operationalize politician quality and ability, we use performance and
productivity measures in the council: the number of ordinances that a councilor has
sponsored or authored. According to councilors we interviewed, the number of ordinances sponsored or co-sponsored is the most direct measure of their performance.
Using novel data on thousands of ordinances passed, we estimate a simple regression comparing the number of ordinances sponsored or authored by dynasties and
non-dynasties:

Ordinanceit = α + βDynastyit + it

(4)

While we do not claim causality, we find no correlation between dynastic status
and performance in the council, based on various performance measures used (see
Table 9). Finally, if dynasties are thought to be inherently worse, then any other
dynastic relationship should also show the same result. However, considering dynastic
relations of councilors with the mayor or other councilors does not yield the same
robust finding (see Tables 10 and 11). That we only see a family first effect for vice
mayor-councilor dynastic pairs implies that general dynastic ability (or lack thereof)
cannot explain the entirety of our findings. Altogether, the evidence presented in this
subsection suggests that candidate selection is not driving our main results.

8.4

Information

Can the family first effect be driven by private information that is held by political
dynasties? A competing explanation is that dynasties engage in information sharing,
where dynastic politicians gather more information and share this with members of
dynastic politician’s ability, occurring right at the last and third term.
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Table 9: Dynasty and Political Performance

Dynasty
Dep Var Mean
N

Any
Ordinances
Sponsored
(1)
0.0354
(0.1312)
0.6078
1,540

Number of
Number of
Finance
Public Welfare
Ordinances
Ordinances
Ordinances
Ordinances
Sponsored Co-Sponsored Sponsored
Sponsored
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
0.0262
-0.6114
0.1985
0.0117
(3.5974)
(1.7604)
(1.9744)
(0.2090)
5.9026
2.8201
1.8032
0.2740
1,540
1,540
1,540
1,540

Note: Robust standard errors clustered at the city level are in parentheses. Dependent variables
are: (1) dummy for ordinances sponsored, (2) number of ordinances sponsored, (3) number
of ordinances co-sponsored, (3) number of finance ordinances sponsored (i.e. budget), and (5)
number of public welfare ordinances sponsored (i.e. health, education, employment). The dynasty
variable is an indicator for whether the councilor is related to the vice mayor. The unit of
observation is a candidate. ***,** and * denote statistical significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent
levels, respectively.

the family. Dynasties may know more about their members’ winnability and family
resources, which leads them not to use rank information when making decisions to
run. Private information can then potentially counter public signals ensuing from
rank. For example, since the vice mayor heads the council, the relationship with
the vice mayor may proxy for ‘insider information’ within the city or village council.
To test this claim, we consider whether being related to another councilor (who is
in the same council) also leads to the same effect. Although the vice mayor is the
highest executive in the council, family ties with another councilor can also proxy
for information sharing among council members. Using the results from Table 10, we
see that relationships among councilors cannot explain the reversal of the first place
effect.
However, it can still be argued that the power dynamic between vice mayors and
councilors is different from that among councilors who are in the same level. A politician in higher office may obtain better and more information about local elections than
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Table 10: Council Dynamics
Full Sample

Optimal Bandwidth

Quadratic
Cubic
Linear
(1)
(2)
(3)
City: Councilor Related to Other Councilors
First
0.0800∗∗∗ 0.0747∗∗∗
0.0658∗∗∗
(0.00640) (0.00677)
(0.00841)

Linear
(4)
0.0559∗∗∗
(0.0112)

Dynasty

-0.0282
(0.0178)

-0.0295
(0.0209)

-0.00705
(0.0227)

-0.0112
(0.0289)

First × Dynasty

-0.00921
(0.0304)
0.119
1
29,290

-0.00732
(0.0353)
0.119
1
29,290

-0.0242
(0.0387)
0.119
CCT=0.014
23,292

-0.0117
(0.0489)
0.119
IK=0.007
15,326

Second Place Mean
Bandwidth
N

Village: Councilor Related to Other Councilors
First
0.0683∗∗∗ 0.0641∗∗∗
0.0636∗∗∗
(0.00247) (0.00271)
(0.00319)
Dynasty

-0.00669∗
(0.00390)

-0.00701
(0.00439)

First × Dynasty

-0.00962
(0.00653)
0.088
1
159,994

-0.00631
-0.0144∗
(0.00724)
(0.00855)
0.088
0.088
1
CCT=0.027
159,994
136,854

Second Place Mean
Bandwidth
N

-0.000851
(0.00525)

0.0572∗∗∗
(0.00556)
0.000750
(0.00958)
-0.0150
(0.0150)
0.088
IK=0.007
64,216

Note: Robust standard errors clustered at the constituency level are in parentheses.
Dependent variable is the probability of running for a higher office: vice mayor for
city and village chair for village regressions. The dynasty variable is an indicator
for whether the councilor is related to another councilor. The unit of observation
is a candidate. Columns 1-2 use the full sample with quadratic and cubic control
functions. Column 3 uses the Calonico et al. (2014) selection method while column 4
uses the Imbens and Kalyanaraman (2012) selection method. Second place mean is
the estimated value of the dependent variable for the second placer using the Imbens
and Kalyanaraman (2012) method. ***,** and * denote statistical significance at the
1, 5 and 10 percent levels, respectively.
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a politician in lower office. In addition, the councilor elections have multiple winners
(first-n-past-the-post) while vice mayor elections only have one winner (first-past-thepost), which may cause the dynamics to be different.34 As a result, it could be a more
specific type of information—within family and at a certain political position—that
underlies the family first effect. Dynastic vice mayors, by winning their election, may
have built up sufficient knowledge about what factors are important to succeed in
elections. They then transmit information about what they have learned to members
of their dynasty, in this case the city and village councilors. Legislators then update
their priors on what it takes to win by weighting the public information subsumed in
the rank less and weighting the private information from their senior family members
more. We test this by considering another position which shares the characteristics
above: being more senior and in a higher position than the councilor, while having
at least as much knowledge about electoral processes as the vice mayor. Instead of
looking at dynastic relations between the vice mayor and councilor, or among councilors, we now consider whether a relationship with the incumbent mayor matters. In
Table 11, we see that mayors, despite being in a powerful position, do not counteract
the first place effect.
It is still possible that the information the vice mayor acquires is one that is very
specific to his/her office. We think this is unlikely for two reasons. First, the earlier
evidence that the family first effect is only significant in non-term limit terms does
34

A number of politicians we interviewed made this observation. First place councilors, by virtue
of being labeled first, immediately get a boost of confidence that topping the councilor race will allow
them to pursue higher office. However, the politicians we interviewed mention that elections with
n winners differ from elections with a sole winner since the campaign styles may vary and voting
preferences can differ. For example, in multi-winner elections, a candidate may rank first even if
he/she was not the top choice of the voters. In solo winner elections however, a candidate can only
rank first if he/she was the top choice, simply because voters can only vote for one candidate.
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Table 11: Information from Mayor
Full Sample
Quadratic
Cubic
(1)
(2)
City: Councilor Related to Mayor
First
0.0673∗∗∗ 0.0648∗∗∗
(0.00803) (0.00922)

Optimal Bandwidth
Linear
(3)

Linear
(4)

0.0655∗∗∗
(0.00958)

0.0574∗∗∗
(0.0117)

Dynasty

-0.0259
(0.0276)

-0.0213
(0.0307)

-0.0189
(0.0382)

-0.0103
(0.0429)

First × Dynasty

-0.0441
(0.0279)
0.118
1
26,202

-0.0487
(0.0332)
0.118
1
26,202

-0.0594
(0.0404)
0.118
CCT=0.010
19,158

-0.0571
(0.0503)
0.118
IK=0.006
14,084

Second Place Mean
Bandwidth
N

Note: Robust standard errors clustered at the constituency level are in parentheses.
Dependent variable is the probability of running for a higher office: vice mayor for
city and village chair for village regressions. The dynasty variable is an indicator for
whether the councilor is related to the mayor. The unit of observation is a candidate.
Columns 1-2 use the full sample with quadratic and cubic control functions. Column
3 uses the Calonico et al. (2014) selection method while column 4 uses the Imbens and
Kalyanaraman (2012) selection method. Second place mean is the estimated value
of the dependent variable for the second placer using the Imbens and Kalyanaraman
(2012) method. ***,** and * denote statistical significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent
levels, respectively.

not align well with the information story. In fact, if information from the vice mayor
is driving our results, it must actually be stronger in cases when he/she is term
limited as this also proxies for having had more experience and knowledge gained
over the years. Second, given that the mayor is of a higher position than the vice
mayor, it is more natural to think that mayoral candidates obtain more information
and experience from running a bigger campaign. In other words, the difficulty of a
campaign (e.g. information, resources and skill requirements) is directly proportional
to the position being run. This is also supported by qualitative evidence we obtained
from politician interviews. Finally, in Appendix H, we discuss competing sources of
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information that may impact the first place effect, and find no evidence that lends
support to the information mechanism.

9

Conclusion

Political dynasties remain pervasive in electoral democracies all over the world. This
has remained true despite political modernization theories claiming that development
moves societies away from personalistic, family-based systems towards more impersonal, meritocratic modes of politics. In this paper, we answer why political dynasties
persist over time and what allows them to maintain their grip on power. Dynasties
function according to internal norms, which on the one hand make them disregard
information from elections, but on the other allows the dynasty, and all the political
benefits associated with dynastic status, to survive.
To test our argument, we first document two empirical facts: (i) first place effects,
the greater propensity of first place politicians to seek higher office than second place
counterparts, are pervasive across local governments in the Philippines, and (ii) the
family first effect—political dynasties counteract this first place effect. These results
jointly imply that families function differently from other political actors. They are
less inclined to use information about electoral outcomes, and only do so when they
do not obstruct their internal norms. We then provide evidence consistent with
internal norms as the mechanism that provides dynastic stability. We show that
families operate on hierarchical and patriarchal norms: rank effects are stronger only
for dynastic councilors who are replacing term-limited or female chairs. Finally, we
rule out a variety of alternative mechanisms that may explain why the first place
effect result exists or whether family ties are actually mitigating rank effects.
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Our results suggest new directions for both the study of rank effects and the
study of political dynasties. First, we contribute to the growing literature on political
dynasties (Querubin, 2016; Fiva and Smith, 2018; Van Coppenolle, 2017; Folke et al.,
2016; Geys and Smith, 2017). The literature has posited various ways by which
dynasties affect electoral success, such as via the incumbency advantage (Dal Bo
et al., 2009; Querubin, 2016; Fiva and Smith, 2018) or through local family networks
(Cruz et al., 2017). Our paper explores how within-dynasty norms perpetuate political
families. Natural extensions of this theme are (i) explaining how these norms form
and evolved historically, (ii) exploring how different dynastic structures—across space
(horizontal) and across time (vertical)—relate and interact or use these norms in
different ways, and (iii) examining other potential family norms in other contexts
and linking these norms to political behavior.
Second, our paper implies that informal institutions like political families mitigate
rank effects whereas formal institutions such as parties perpetuate them (Fujiwara
and Sanz, 2019; Folke et al., 2016). This bifurcation may not necessarily be the
case. Further evidence of families offsetting rank effects and potential evidence of
parties also playing this role will allow for more refined theoretical conditions of when
organizations can mitigate rank.
In general, our findings shed light on the variety of forms political alliances take
and the positive and negative effects of these linkages. On the one hand, political
dynasties may perpetuate clientelistic politics and keep political power in the hands of
the few. On the other hand, family ties may also serve as efficient vehicles for optimal
decision-making for politicians. Policy schemes that aspire for political development
must therefore consider how to build institutions where norms evolve in a way that
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leads to optimal decision-making, while at the same time remaining egalitarian and
democratic.
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Appendix A

Naming Convention and Name Matching

How do we identify politicians across time and their family members given our data?
For some existing studies, identification follows naturally from definition given the
availability of data. For example, Folke et al. (2016) and Eggers and Hainmueller
(2009) use birth registers and historical biographies to identify family connections.
However, in the absence of high quality data, we exploit naming conventions to recognize the same politician through time and identify dynastic relations (as is common
in the literature in developing countries).
In the Philippines, the naming tradition is as follows:
given_name middle_name last_name suffix_name
Jose
Garcia
dela Cruz
Jr.
The given name may consist of one or more names. Although the middle name
is used as in the United States, the main difference is that it must be the mother’s
maiden name. The middle name is not considered a surname, and the mother’s
maiden name comes before the father’s surname. In the Philippines, only the last
name, which comes from the father’s last name, is considered an individual’s surname.
When males get married, no change occurs in their names. For females, however,
the usual practice is to take on the spouse’s last name. In addition to the usual
components, males may also have a suffix name if their given and last names match
their father’s. Suffixes can be Jr. (or Sr. for fathers), II, III, and so on.
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Table A1: Distribution of Top 10 Last Names
Last Name
Dela Cruz
Garcia
Reyes
Ramos
Mendoza
Bautista
Flores
Santos
Gonzales
Fernandez
Total

A.1

Frequency
7,494
5,441
5,331
5,116
4,683
3,862
3,790
3,441
3,427
3,402
45,987

Percent
0.50
0.36
0.35
0.34
0.31
0.26
0.25
0.23
0.23
0.23
3.06

Matching Politicians Across Time

In the elections data, names of candidates are provided, although some components
may be incomplete or missing. The most common source of name discrepancies
originates from the shortening of the middle name to just the middle initial (in some
years, the same candidate maybe listed as having a middle name ‘G’ or ‘Garcia’).
Another potential source is providing a suffix name in some years but not others.
In this section, we test whether our results are robust to using different methods
for name matching. Our baseline approach uses the first and last names to match
individuals across time. First, we show that including the suffix name, middle initial
or the middle name does not change the results. In fact, all estimates remain statistically significant and robust. Tables A2, A3 and A4 present the provincial, city and
village results using the different methods. Second, we drop observations whose last
name belongs to the top 10 most common last names in the Philippines (see Table
A1). This addresses the issue of mismatches due to common names. Comparing
Tables 2 and A5, we find that results remain unchanged.
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A.2

Identifying Dynastic Relations

Following the existing literature, we identify family networks via a matching procedure where individuals with identical last names residing in the same constituency
(e.g. province, city or village) at the same time are considered related. Two errors
associated with this method are: (i) false negatives and (ii) false positives.
The issue of false negatives is not very problematic in that a dynasty that is
not identified only makes it harder to detect a significant effect. If one believes
that dynasties dampen (enlarge) rank effects, then being identified as non-dynasty
increases (decreases) the point estimate. In both cases, the effect is attenuated and
serves as the upper (lower) bound of the true parameters. Another reason why this
does not pose a significant problem is that married women who are part of a dynasty
normally use the name that provides greater electoral advantage.35
The issue of false positives is that if there are many common last names within a
province, then there would be substantial errors in how we identify dynasties. Compared to other countries, we argue that this is not a major issue for the Philippines,
because the modal surname accounts for only 0.32% of all last names.36 Moreover,
Querubin (2016) recounts that in 1849, Spanish officials, concerned with the arbitrary
35
For example, the Binay dynasty has ruled the city of Makati from 1986 until the present, where
several family members have simultaneously and sequentially held office as mayor, vice mayor and
congressperson. The current mayor of Makati is Abigail Binay-Campos, who does not use her
husband’s last name in campaigns and other election-related documents. In the dataset, she is listed
as Abigail Binay, her maiden name. On the contrary, consider Lucy Torres-Gomez, wife of Richard
Gomez, a popular actor in Philippine show business. Given the prominence of her husband, she
has constantly used her hyphenated surname in campaigns and other paraphernalia. She appears
as Lucy Torres-Gomez in the dataset and therefore is considered a member of the Gomez dynasty
in Ormoc City.
36
Fafchamps and Labonne (2017) note that in other Asian countries, modal last names are more
common: China (7.25%), India (5.5%), Taiwan (11%) and Vietnam (38%). Our figures slightly vary
due to our different samples. We derive the top 10 most common last names from our elections data
using all local positions.
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selection of surnames by Filipinos, assigned different names to different family heads
in each town. This led to a catalog of about 61,000 different surnames.37 Although
this may not completely eliminate concerns over correctly identifying dynasties, we believe that in the Philippines the concern of incorrectly matching last names is greatly
ameliorated. We do the same exercise above and drop observations with common last
names. Again, we find that results in Tables 4 and A6 are similar.

37

Querubin (2016) explains in detail the historical account of name distribution in the Philippines.

0.01
[N =3,606]

0.04
[N =2,696]

0.0202∗∗
(0.00985)

0.0523∗∗∗
(0.0128)

0.0350∗∗∗
(0.0114)

0.0859∗∗∗
(0.0138)

0.017
[N =1,709]

0.015
[N =1,574]

0.014
[N =1,459]

0.019
[N =1,796]

0.0171
(0.0123)

0.0281
(0.0234)

0.0196
(0.0171)

0.0696∗∗∗
(0.0241)

0.0218
(0.0202)

0.0700∗∗∗
(0.0260)

Linear
(7)

Note: Robust standard errors clustered at the province level are in parentheses. Dependent variable is the probability of
running for or winning as the vice governor. The unit of observation is a candidate. Columns 2-3 use the full sample with
quadratic and cubic control functions. Column 5 uses the Calonico et al. (2014) selection method while column 7 uses
the Imbens and Kalyanaraman (2012) selection method. Columns 4 and 6 provide the optimal value for each procedure.
The number of observations for the full sample and bandwidth methods is reported in brackets. Second place mean is the
estimated value of the dependent variable for the second placer using the Imbens and Kalyanaraman (2012) method. ***,**
and * denote statistical significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent levels, respectively.

Election, t + k

0.0190∗∗
(0.00822)

0.056
[N =2,998]

First Name + Last Name + Middle Name
Candidacy, t + k
0.024
0.0503∗∗∗ 0.0504∗∗∗
[N =3,606]
(0.0105)
(0.0124)
0.0175∗∗
(0.00693)

0.04
[N =2,686]

0.015
[N =3,606]

0.0314∗∗∗
(0.00954)

Election, t + k

0.0287∗∗∗
(0.00830)

0.048
[N =2,866]

First Name + Last Name + Middle Initial
Candidacy, t + k
0.036
0.0784∗∗∗ 0.0802∗∗∗
[N =3,606]
(0.0110)
(0.0130)

0.015
[N =3,606]

0.011
[N =1,285]

0.0828∗∗∗
(0.0149)

0.046
[N =2,821]
0.0354∗∗∗
(0.0123)

0.017
[N =1,711]

Linear
(5)

0.039
[N =2,670]

Optimal
Value
(6)

Bandwidth: IK

Optimal
Value
(4)

Bandwidth: CCT

0.0312∗∗∗
(0.0100)

Election, t + k

0.0281∗∗∗
(0.00831)

Second Place
Mean
Quadratic
Cubic
(1)
(2)
(3)
First Name + Last Name + Suffix Name
Candidacy, t + k
0.038
0.0753∗∗∗ 0.0768∗∗∗
[N =3,606]
(0.0113)
(0.0136)

Full Sample

Table A2: First Place Effect (Province), by Name Matching Method
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0.029
[N =29,540]

0.012
[N =23,048]

0.0111∗∗
(0.00479)

0.0322∗∗∗
(0.00648)

0.0168∗∗∗
(0.00607)

0.0555∗∗∗
(0.00809)

0.004
[N =12,418]

0.005
[N =14,408]

0.005
[N =14,218]

0.006
[N =15,176]

0.0141∗∗
(0.00711)

0.0251∗∗∗
(0.00834)

0.0132
(0.00823)

0.0491∗∗∗
(0.0102)

0.0117
(0.00805)

0.0484∗∗∗
(0.0102)

Linear
(7)

Note: Robust standard errors clustered at the city level are in parentheses. Dependent variable is the probability of running
for or winning as the vice mayor. The unit of observation is a candidate. Columns 2-3 use the full sample with quadratic
and cubic control functions. Column 5 uses the Calonico et al. (2014) selection method while column 7 uses the Imbens and
Kalyanaraman (2012) selection method. Columns 4 and 6 provide the optimal value for each procedure. The number of
observations for the full sample and bandwidth methods is reported in brackets. Second place mean is the estimated value
of the dependent variable for the second placer using the Imbens and Kalyanaraman (2012) method. ***,** and * denote
statistical significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent levels, respectively.

Election, t + k

0.0105∗∗∗
(0.00394)

0.011
[N =21,812]

First Name + Last Name + Middle Name
Candidacy, t + k
0.065
0.0415∗∗∗ 0.0357∗∗∗
[N =29,540]
(0.00468) (0.00516)
0.0167∗∗∗
(0.00352)

0.011
[N =22,526]

0.045
[N =29,540]

0.0168∗∗∗
(0.00503)

Election, t + k

0.0267∗∗∗
(0.00455)

0.011
[N =21,934]

First Name + Last Name + Middle Initial
Candidacy, t + k
0.103
0.0673∗∗∗ 0.0588∗∗∗
[N =29,540]
(0.00601) (0.00661)

0.045
[N =29,540]

0.006
[N =14,676]

0.0540∗∗∗
(0.00795)

0.011
[N =22,414]
0.0150∗∗
(0.00610)

0.006
[N =15,148]

Linear
(5)

0.011
[N =22,204]

Optimal
Value
(6)

Bandwidth: IK

Optimal
Value
(4)

Bandwidth: CCT

0.0157∗∗∗
(0.00501)

Election, t + k

0.0255∗∗∗
(0.00453)

Second Place
Mean
Quadratic
Cubic
(1)
(2)
(3)
First Name + Last Name + Suffix Name
Candidacy, t + k
0.103
0.0649∗∗∗ 0.0559∗∗∗
[N =29,540]
(0.00601) (0.00659)

Full Sample

Table A3: First Place Effect (City), by Name Matching Method
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0.032
[N =159,994]

0.0308∗∗∗
(0.00164)

0.0278∗∗∗
(0.00177)

0.03
[N =159,994]

0.0275∗∗∗
(0.00168)

0.024
[N =132,208]

0.0245∗∗∗
(0.00209)

0.0588∗∗∗
(0.00290)

0.0277∗∗∗
(0.00213)

0.0610∗∗∗
(0.00302)

0.009
[N =77,850]

0.009
[N =75,498]

0.008
[N =71,460]

0.008
[N =74,766]

0.0216∗∗∗
(0.00309)

0.0590∗∗∗
(0.00450)

0.0230∗∗∗
(0.00339)

0.0592∗∗∗
(0.00464)

0.0233∗∗∗
(0.00319)

0.0537∗∗∗
(0.00505)

Linear
(7)

Note: Robust standard errors clustered at the village level are in parentheses. Dependent variable is the probability of running for
or winning as the village chair. The unit of observation is a candidate. Columns 2-3 use the full sample with quadratic and cubic
control functions. Column 5 uses the Calonico et al. (2014) selection method while column 7 uses the Imbens and Kalyanaraman
(2012) selection method. Columns 4 and 6 provide the optimal value for each procedure. The number of observations for the full
sample and bandwidth methods is reported in brackets. Second place mean is the estimated value of the dependent variable for the
second placer using the Imbens and Kalyanaraman (2012) method. ***,** and * denote statistical significance at the 1, 5 and 10
percent levels, respectively.

Election, t + k

0.0300∗∗∗
(0.00160)

0.026
[N =135,614]

First Name + Last Name + Middle Name
Candidacy, t + k
0.082
0.0645∗∗∗ 0.0616∗∗∗
[N =159,994] (0.00221) (0.00234)

0.032
[N =159,994]

0.026
[N =134,140]

0.025
[N =133,198]

0.009
[N =76,616]

0.0593∗∗∗
(0.00299)

0.025
[N =134,060]
0.0267∗∗∗
(0.00210)

0.007
[N =65,340]

Linear
(5)

0.026
[N =134,950760

Optimal
Value
(6)

Bandwidth: IK

Optimal
Value
(4)

Bandwidth: CCT

0.0288∗∗∗
(0.00178)

Election, t + k

0.0320∗∗∗
(0.00166)

First Name + Last Name + Middle Initial
Candidacy, t + k
0.088
0.0676∗∗∗ 0.0638∗∗∗
[N =159,994] (0.00227) (0.00243)

Election, t + k

Second Place
Mean
Quadratic
Cubic
(1)
(2)
(3)
First Name + Last Name + Suffix Name
Candidacy, t + k
0.086
0.0658∗∗∗ 0.0623∗∗∗
[N =159,994] (0.00226) (0.00242)

Full Sample

Table A4: First Place Effect (Village), by Name Matching Method
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0.033
[N =155,181]

0.088
[N =155,181]

0.045
[N =28,749]

0.104
[N =28,749]

0.015
[N =3,485]

0.037
[N =3,485]

0.0628∗∗∗
(0.00248)
0.0277∗∗∗
(0.00181)

0.0310∗∗∗
(0.00169)

0.0174∗∗∗
(0.00512)

0.0276∗∗∗
(0.00462)
0.0667∗∗∗
(0.00232)

0.0599∗∗∗
(0.00674)

0.0339∗∗∗
(0.0103)

0.0302∗∗∗
(0.00859)
0.0689∗∗∗
(0.00614)

0.0806∗∗∗
(0.0143)

Cubic
(3)

0.0786∗∗∗
(0.0120)

Quadratic
(2)

0.027
[N =133,397]

0.027
[N =132,670]

0.011
[N =21,773]

0.011
[N =22,177]

0.04
[N =2,611]

0.048
[N =2,782]

Optimal
Value
(4)

0.0276∗∗∗
(0.00212)

0.0609∗∗∗
(0.00300)

0.0169∗∗
(0.00626)

0.0584∗∗∗
(0.00805)

0.0385∗∗∗
(0.0123)

0.0861∗∗∗
(0.0149)

Linear
(5)

Bandwidth: CCT

0.008
[N =72,679]

0.007
[N =63,086]

0.007
[N =16,016]

0.008
[N =17,539]

0.012
[N =1,284]

0.015
[N =1,550]

Optimal
Value
(6)

0.0237∗∗∗
(0.00333)

0.0546∗∗∗
(0.00520)

0.0151∗
(0.00788)

0.0534∗∗∗
(0.00937)

0.0214
(0.0210)

0.0623∗∗
(0.0275)

Linear
(7)

Bandwidth: IK

Note: Robust standard errors clustered at the constituency level are in parentheses. Dependent variable is the probability of running
for or winning the higher office: vice governor for province, vice mayor for city and village chair for village regressions. The unit
of observation is a candidate. Columns 2-3 use the full sample with quadratic and cubic control functions. Column 5 uses the
Calonico et al. (2014) selection method while column 7 uses the Imbens and Kalyanaraman (2012) selection method. Columns 4
and 6 provide the optimal value for each procedure. The number of observations for the full sample and bandwidth methods is
reported in brackets. Second place mean is the estimated value of the dependent variable for the second placer using the Imbens
and Kalyanaraman (2012) method. ***,** and * denote statistical significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent levels, respectively.

Election, t + k

Village
Candidacy, t + k

Election, t + k

City
Candidacy, t + k

Election, t + k

Province
Candidacy, t + k

Second Place
Mean
(1)

Full Sample

Table A5: First Place Effect (Excluding Common Last Names)
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Table A6: Family First Effect (Excluding Common Last Names)
Full Sample

Optimal Bandwidth

(1)
(2)
(3)
City: Councilor Running for Vice Mayor
First
0.0691∗∗∗ 0.0652∗∗∗
0.0670∗∗∗
(0.00802) (0.00926)
(0.00936)
Dynasty

-0.0430
(0.0289)

-0.0853∗∗
(0.0383)
Second Place Mean
0.118
Bandwidth
1
Function
Quadratic
N
25,511
First × Dynasty

(4)
0.0646∗∗∗
(0.0112)

-0.0234
(0.0322)

-0.0386
(0.0397)

-0.0195
(0.0451)

-0.108∗∗
(0.0435)
0.118
1
Cubic
25,511

-0.106∗∗
(0.0530)
0.118
CCT=0.011
Linear
19,264

-0.127∗∗
(0.0600)
0.118
IK=0.007
Linear
14,891

Village: Councilor Running for Village Chair
First
0.0677∗∗∗ 0.0642∗∗∗
0.0629∗∗∗
(0.00240) (0.00255)
(0.00307)

0.0578∗∗∗
(0.00536)

0.0130∗∗
(0.00611)

0.0129∗
(0.00715)

0.0132
(0.00857)

0.0385∗∗
(0.0161)

-0.0218∗∗
(0.00953)
Second Place Mean
0.088
Bandwidth
1
Function
Quadratic
N
155,177

-0.0219∗∗
(0.0112)
0.088
1
Cubic
155,177

-0.0362∗∗∗
(0.0131)
0.088
CCT=0.028
Linear
133,635

-0.0494∗∗
(0.0237)
0.088
IK=0.007
Linear
62,853

Dynasty
First × Dynasty

Note: Robust standard errors clustered at the constituency level are in parentheses.
Dependent variable is the probability of running for a higher office: vice mayor for
city and village chair for village regressions. The dynasty variable is an indicator for
whether the councilor is related to the incumbent vice mayor (city) or village chair
(village). The unit of observation is a candidate. Columns 1-2 use the full sample
with quadratic and cubic control functions. Column 3 uses the Calonico et al. (2014)
selection method while column 4 uses the Imbens and Kalyanaraman (2012) selection
method. Second place mean is the estimated value of the dependent variable for the
second placer using the Imbens and Kalyanaraman (2012) method. ***,** and *
denote statistical significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent levels, respectively.
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Appendix B

Bounds on Effects Conditional on Candidacy

Across all levels of government, the findings imply an increased probability of running
and winning for first placers compared to second placers. An important question is
whether first placers are more likely to win conditional on running, and not merely
due to the increased probability of candidacy. The existing RD setup is unable to
test this given that first and second placers who win conditional on running are not
comparable, and maybe a result of candidate selection. In particular, second placers
who choose to run may have individual-specific characteristics that make them an
inappropriate control group for first placers.
Following Lee (2009) and Anagol and Fujiwara (2016), we provide bounds on
the estimate on the probability of winning, conditional on running. To do this, we
assume that: (i) there are no defiers (i.e. second placers who run again would also
run again if they had come in first), (ii) second place compliers would never win the
next election if they chose to run in it (to compute the upper bound), and (iii) second
place compliers would have at most the same probability of winning as first placers
who chose to run (to compute the lower bound).
Using the provincial estimates from Table 2, the lower bound is -0.006 (standard
error [SE] = 0.0878) and the upper bound is 0.175 (SE = 0.159). For the city level,
the lower bound is -0.056 (SE = 0.032) and the upper bound is 0.080 (SE = 0.048).
For the village level, the lower bound is -0.004 (SE = 0.013) and the upper bound
is 0.153 (SE = 0.020). Another approach is to calculate how large the unobservable
probability of a close second-place complier would have to be in order for all the effect
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on winning to be explained by selection into candidacy. In the provincial level, a close
second place complier would have to win with a probability of 29.59 percent (SE =
24.45) to imply that there is no effect on winning conditional on running. In the city
level, the value is 26.31 percent (SE = 13.29) while in the village level, the value is
39.52 percent (SE = 4.39).
Combining these results, we cannot make any claims about positive effects conditional on candidacy. Unlike in Anagol and Fujiwara (2016) where the range of
conditional coefficients was significantly above zero, our lower and upper bound estimates (except for the village upper bound) are indistinguishable from zero. In other
words, we cannot say that there is an effect on winning beyond the effect on running.
In the paper, we focus on results for running, but present the results on winning for
completeness.
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Appendix C

Robustness to Bandwidths
Figure C1: Robustness to Bandwidths

(a) Province: Candidacy, t + k

(b) Province: Election t + k

(c) City: Candidacy, t + k

(d) City: Election t + k

(e) Village: Candidacy, t + k

(f) Village: Election t + k

Note: Dependent variable is the probability of running for or winning the higher office. The horizontal axis shows the range of bandwidth values, with the maximum value chosen such that 95% of
the observations are in the sample. The blue circle is the coefficient estimate, with the thick blue
bar showing the 90% confidence interval and the thin blue bar showing the 95% confidence interval.
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Appendix D

Other Rank Results
Figure D1: Other Rank Results

(a) Province: Candidacy, t + k

(b) Province: Election, t + k

(c) City: Candidacy, t + k

(d) City: Election, t + k

(e) Village: Candidacy, t + k

(f) Village: Election, t + k

Linear
(7)

0.004
0.00240∗∗∗ 0.00203∗∗∗
0.005
-0.000826
0.003
-0.000887
[N =74,864] (0.000644) (0.000753) [N =53,212] (0.00105) [N =38,174] (0.00133)

0.02
0.0148∗∗∗ 0.0140∗∗∗
0.005
0.00677∗∗∗
0.002
0.000649
[N =74,864] (0.00146) (0.00168) [N =51,294] (0.00244) [N =33,422] (0.00336)

0.002
0.00351∗∗∗ 0.00380∗∗∗
0.007
0.00221∗
0.002
0.00147
[N =29,254] (0.000829) (0.000916) [N =24,228] (0.00125) [N =13,806] (0.00180)

0.01
0.0173∗∗∗ 0.0180∗∗∗
0.006
0.0153∗∗∗
0.002
0.0101∗∗∗
[N =29,254] (0.00184) (0.00204) [N =23,768] (0.00272) [N =15,808] (0.00387)

0.00259
0.00235
0.05
0.00226
0.02
0.00479
(0.00244) (0.00271) [N =2,732] (0.00302) [N =1,954] (0.00466)

0.0208∗∗∗ 0.0203∗∗∗
0.041
0.0155∗∗
0.015
0.0153∗
(0.00534) (0.00597) [N =2,548] (0.00687) [N =1,732] (0.00858)

Linear
(5)

Optimal
Value
(6)

Bandwidth: IK

Note: Robust standard errors clustered at the constituency level are in parentheses. Dependent variable is the probability
of running for the higher position: provincial vice governor for province, city vice mayor for city and village chair for
village regressions. The unit of observation is a candidate. The number of observations for the full sample and bandwidth
methods is reported in brackets. Lower rank mean is the estimated value of the dependent variable for the lower ranked
candidate using the Imbens and Kalyanaraman (2012) method. ***,** and * denote statistical significance at the 1, 5
and 10 percent levels, respectively.

Election, t + k

Village
Candidacy, t + k

Election, t + k

City
Candidacy, t + k

0.001
[N =3,552]

0.005
[N =3,552]

Cubic
(3)

Optimal
Value
(4)

Bandwidth: CCT

Appendix E

Election, t + k

Province
Candidacy, t + k

Lower Rank
Mean
Quadratic
(1)
(2)

Full Sample

Table E1: Incumbency Effect on Promotion
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Incumbency Effects

0.266
[N =74,864]

0.486
[N =74,864]

0.167
[N =29,254]

0.34
[N =29,254]

0.071
[N =3,552]

0.178
[N =3,552]

0.169∗∗∗
(0.00514)
0.0584∗∗∗
(0.00508)

0.0697∗∗∗
(0.00445)

0.163∗∗∗
(0.00685)

0.175∗∗∗
(0.00644)
0.171∗∗∗
(0.00452)

0.270∗∗∗
(0.00725)

0.308∗∗∗
(0.0187)

0.308∗∗∗
(0.0187)
0.272∗∗∗
(0.00661)

0.363∗∗∗
(0.0212)

Cubic
(3)

0.353∗∗∗
(0.0184)

Quadratic
(2)

0.005
[N =53,616]

0.008
[N =63,190]

0.005
[N =22,734]

0.007
[N =24,558]

0.056
[N =2,816]

0.051
[N =2,740]

Optimal
Value
(4)

0.0373∗∗∗
(0.00749)

0.166∗∗∗
(0.00629)

0.143∗∗∗
(0.00910)

0.264∗∗∗
(0.00901)

0.305∗∗∗
(0.0225)

0.373∗∗∗
(0.0224)

Linear
(5)

Bandwidth: CCT

0.002
[N =28,930]

0.002
[N =25,458]

0.005
[N =22,178]

0.002
[N =15,764]

0.011
[N =1,430]

0.014
[N =1,642]

Optimal
Value
(6)

0.0134
(0.0124)

0.131∗∗∗
(0.0132)

0.145∗∗∗
(0.00939)

0.264∗∗∗
(0.0132)

0.266∗∗∗
(0.0401)

0.321∗∗∗
(0.0359)

Linear
(7)

Bandwidth: IK

Note: Robust standard errors clustered at the constituency level are in parentheses. Dependent variable is the probability of
running for or winning the same office again: provincial board member for province, city councilor for city and village councilor
for village regressions. The unit of observation is a candidate. Columns 2-3 use the full sample with quadratic and cubic control
functions. Column 5 uses the Calonico et al. (2014) selection method while column 7 uses the Imbens and Kalyanaraman (2012)
selection method. Columns 4 and 6 provide the optimal value for each procedure. The number of observations for the full
sample and bandwidth methods is reported in brackets. Lower rank mean is the estimated value of the dependent variable for
the lower ranked candidate using the Imbens and Kalyanaraman (2012) method. ***,** and * denote statistical significance at
the 1, 5 and 10 percent levels, respectively.

Election, t + k

Village
Candidacy, t + k

Election, t + k

City
Candidacy, t + k

Election, t + k

Province
Candidacy, t + k

Second Place
Mean
(1)

Full Sample

Table E2: Classic Incumbency Effect
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-0.0214
(0.0257)

-0.0385
(0.0262)
0.041
[N =2,702]

0.038
[N =2,603]
-0.0162
(0.0290)

-0.0281
(0.0298)

Linear
(5)

0.037
[N =2,590]

0.022
[N =2,004]

Optimal
Value
(6)

-0.0158
(0.0317)

-0.0358
(0.0362)

Linear
(7)

0.48
-0.0265∗∗∗ -0.0295∗∗∗
0.023
-0.0355∗∗∗
0.008
-0.0444∗∗∗
[N =159,994] (0.00332) (0.00361) [N =129,138] (0.00463) [N =70,090] (0.00730)

0.627
-0.0557∗∗∗ -0.0514∗∗∗
0.026
-0.0461∗∗∗
0.013
-0.0480∗∗∗
[N =159,994] (0.00327) (0.00354) [N =135,848] (0.00433) [N =96,964] (0.00570)

0.454
-0.0389∗∗∗ -0.0362∗∗∗
0.016
-0.0429∗∗
0.014
-0.0416∗∗∗
[N =29,540] (0.00760) (0.00863) [N =25,738] (0.00964) [N =24,824] (0.00991)

0.544
-0.0577∗∗∗ -0.0467∗∗∗
0.012
-0.0465∗∗∗
0.005
-0.0427∗∗∗
[N =29,540] (0.00775) (0.00865) [N =22,884] (0.0103) [N =13,568] (0.0144)

-0.0146
(0.0208)

-0.0408∗∗
(0.0200)

Optimal
Value
(4)

Bandwidth: IK

Note: Robust standard errors clustered at the constituency level are in parentheses. Dependent variable is the probability
of running for or winning the same office again: provincial board member for province, city councilor for city and village
councilor for village regressions. The unit of observation is a candidate. The number of observations for the full sample
and bandwidth methods is reported in brackets. Second place mean is the estimated value of the dependent variable
for the second placer using the Imbens and Kalyanaraman (2012) method. ***,** and * denote statistical significance
at the 1, 5 and 10 percent levels, respectively.

Election, t + k

Village
Candidacy, t + k

Election, t + k

City
Candidacy, t + k

0.39
[N =3,606]

0.487
[N =3,606]

Cubic
(3)

Bandwidth: CCT

Appendix F

Election, t + k

Province
Candidacy, t + k

Second Place
Mean
Quadratic
(1)
(2)

Full Sample

Table F1: First Place Effect (for the Same Position)
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Rank Effects for the Same Position
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Appendix G

Dynasties: Balance and Control
Table G1: Balance Table

Land Area
Population
No. of Villages
Total Income
Total Expenditure

Dynasty
18,932
36,977
16.8
77.1
62.3

Non-Dynasty
21,071
50,568
19.4
107
86

Difference p-value
N
-2,138
0.11
12,405
-13,590
0.03
12,747
-2.62
0.16
6,465
-29.8
0.23
12,852
-23.7
0.17
12,852

Note: Land area is measured in hectares. Total income and expenditure are measured in
million pesos. All variables are at the city or municipality level.

Table G2: Family First Effect with Control
Full Sample

Optimal Bandwidth

Quadratic
(1)
0.0700∗∗∗
(0.00797)

Cubic
(2)
0.0662∗∗∗
(0.00918)

Linear
(3)
0.0660∗∗∗
(0.00948)

Linear
(4)
0.0580∗∗∗
(0.0115)

Dynasty

-0.0506∗
(0.0272)

-0.0339
(0.0299)

-0.0486
(0.0373)

-0.0364
(0.0428)

First × Dynasty

-0.0860∗∗
(0.0359)

-0.106∗∗∗
(0.0405)

-0.101∗∗
(0.049)

-0.119∗∗
(0.0574)

Population

-0.0387∗∗
(0.0155)
0.12
1
25,946

-0.0386∗∗
(0.0155)
0.12
1
25,946

-0.0385∗∗
(0.019)
0.12
CCT=.01
18,972

-0.0423∗∗
(0.0198)
.12
IK=.006
13,940

First

Second Place Mean
Bandwidth
N

Note: Robust standard errors clustered at the constituency level are in parentheses.
Dependent variable is the probability of running for a higher office: vice mayor for
city and village chair for village regressions. The dynasty variable is an indicator
for whether the councilor is related to the incumbent vice mayor (city) or village
chair (village). Population is the number of individuals in that city/municipality
(in millions). The unit of observation is a candidate. Second place mean is the
estimated value of the dependent variable for the second placer using the Imbens
and Kalyanaraman (2012) method. The reported F -statistic and p-value are from
the test of the sum of coefficients, First and First × Dynasty. ***,** and * denote
statistical significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent levels, respectively.
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Appendix H

Information and First Place Effects

Do other sources of information matter for rank effects? While we have discussed
intra-family private information transfer as a competing mechanism for our results,
we also explore the possibility of other sources of information as potentially reducing
or exacerbating first place effects.

Social Learning | First, we ask if politicians can learn from past political customs
or traditions in his/her constituency. Specifically, if a city has a history of its first
place councilors run for (and win as) vice mayor, would it encourage the incumbent
first placer to also seek higher position? Given that this information is public and easily accessible, politicians may include this information to their calculus when deciding
whether to run for higher office. Table H1 shows that politicians are unaffected by
such customs.38 Our findings suggest that politicians (whether first or second placers)
disregard past outcomes and decide based on their currrent rank.

Local Media | Second, we examine the potential role of media in highlighting or
playing down rank effects. Given the important role of private information, it is possible that information provided by media institutions can serve as a good substitute.
Consistent with existing studies in the rank effects literature, we show that media does
not seem to have any differential impact on the first place effect.39 First, we show
38

Although some specifications in the city level are significant, the sign is the reverse of what we
would expect. If a city has an established practice of the first placer running and winning for higher
office, then it should percolate positively into the rank effect. However, the results seem to suggest
the opposite.
39
Media presence is defined as the frequency of newspaper distribution in the province that the
city or village is a part of. Using other measures such as number of newspapers in an area as well
as newspaper circulation also show similar results.
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Table H1: Social Learning
Full Sample

Optimal Bandwidth

Quadratic
(1)

Cubic
(2)

Linear
(3)

Linear
(4)

0.0733∗∗∗
(0.00813)

0.0723∗∗∗
(0.00917)

0.0760∗∗∗
(0.00917)

0.0752∗∗∗
(0.0122)

Tradition

0.00906
(0.00968)

0.0186∗
(0.0113)

0.0150
(0.0111)

0.0218
(0.0146)

First × Tradition

-0.0157
(0.0155)
0.118
1
25,936

-0.0323∗
(0.0181)
0.118
1
25,936

-0.0277
(0.0175)
0.118
CCT=0.014
21,492

-0.0462∗∗
(0.0233)
0.118
IK=0.007
14,278

0.0510∗∗∗
(0.00255)

0.0461∗∗∗
(0.00271)

0.0624∗∗∗
(0.00328)

0.0607∗∗∗
(0.00503)

Tradition

-0.0201∗∗∗
(0.00356)

-0.0199∗∗∗
(0.00376)

-0.0175∗∗∗
(0.00456)

-0.0164∗∗
(0.00710)

First × Tradition

-0.00545
(0.00596)
0.091
1
70,278

-0.00533
(0.00630)
0.091
1
70,278

-0.00578
(0.00752)
0.091
CCT=0.026
52,400

-0.00165
(0.0114)
0.091
IK=0.008
23,862

City
First

Second Place Mean
Bandwidth
N
Village
First

Second Place Mean
Bandwidth
N

Note: Robust standard errors clustered at the constituency level are in parentheses.
Dependent variable is the probability of running for a higher office: vice mayor for
city and village chair for village regressions. The tradition variable is an indicator
for whether the constituency has had a first place councilor win for higher office in
the past. The unit of observation is a candidate. Columns 1-2 use the full sample
with quadratic and cubic control functions. Column 3 uses the Calonico et al. (2014)
selection method while column 4 uses the Imbens and Kalyanaraman (2012) selection
method. Second place mean is the estimated value of the dependent variable for the
second placer using the Imbens and Kalyanaraman (2012) method. ***,** and *
denote statistical significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent levels, respectively.
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that politicians do not respond to news information. Results from Table H2 indicate
no significant role for the media to promote or suppress first place effects. Second, we
also study the alternative: does media provide an avenue for local politicians to be ‘in
the news’ ? Using the number of mentions a politician gets from various online news
sources, we find that (i) politicians from local government do not receive significant
media mileage, and (ii) first placers are not featured more than second placers, even
with a very low base.40 Table H3 presents our fiindings.

40

Note that we did the exercise for both national broadsheets and regional/provincial newspapers.
The results presented here are from regional media or local versions of national broadsheets since
there are no (or very limited) mentions of local officials in national newspapers.
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Table H2: Media Presence
Full Sample

Optimal Bandwidth

Quadratic
(1)

Cubic
(2)

Linear
(3)

Linear
(4)

0.109∗∗∗
(0.0406)

0.117∗∗
(0.0502)

0.118∗∗∗
(0.0424)

0.132∗∗
(0.0591)

Media Presence

0.0277
(0.0298)

0.0308
(0.0366)

0.0207
(0.0327)

0.0331
(0.0452)

First × Media Presence

-0.0386
(0.0498)
0.121
1
2,808

-0.0564
(0.0616)
0.121
1
2,808

-0.0633
(0.0541)
0.121
CCT=0.014
2,342

-0.0927
(0.0747)
0.121
IK=0.006
1,456

0.0510∗∗∗
(0.00580)

0.0461∗∗∗
(0.00679)

0.0499∗∗∗
(0.00787)

0.0420∗∗∗
(0.0134)

Media Presence

0.00904∗
(0.00463)

0.00910∗
(0.00529)

0.0103
(0.00657)

0.0203∗
(0.0113)

First × Media Presence

0.00866
(0.00764)
0.088
1
159,384

0.00936
0.00845
(0.00869)
(0.0105)
0.088
0.088
1
CCT=0.027
159,384
136,566

City
First

Second Place Mean
Bandwidth
N
Village
First

Second Place Mean
Bandwidth
N

0.0112
(0.0178)
0.088
IK=0.009
78,004

Note: Robust standard errors clustered at the constituency level are in parentheses.
Dependent variable is the probability of running for a higher office: vice mayor for city
and village chair for village regressions. The tradition variable is an indicator for whether
the constituency has had a first place councilor win for higher office in the past. The
unit of observation is a candidate. Columns 1-2 use the full sample with quadratic and
cubic control functions. Column 3 uses the Calonico et al. (2014) selection method while
column 4 uses the Imbens and Kalyanaraman (2012) selection method. Second place
mean is the estimated value of the dependent variable for the second placer using the
Imbens and Kalyanaraman (2012) method. ***,** and * denote statistical significance
at the 1, 5 and 10 percent levels, respectively.
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Table H3: Online News Mentions
Full Sample

City
First
Second Place Mean
Bandwidth
N
Village
First
Second Place Mean
Bandwidth
N

Optimal Bandwidth

Quadratic
(1)

Cubic
(2)

Linear
(3)

Linear
(4)

0.854∗
(0.510)
1.25
1
8,536

0.409
(0.401)
1.25
1
8,536

-0.541
(0.509)
1.25
CCT=0.005
3,907

-0.434
(0.440)
1.25
IK=0.004
3,235

-0.0890
(0.0.0906)
0.93
1
160,321

-0.0989
(0.103)
0.93
1
160,321

-0.0759
(0.125)
0.93
CCT=0.025
150,539

-0.0681
(0.208)
0.93
IK=0.009
95,101

Note: Robust standard errors clustered at the constituency level are in parentheses.
Dependent variable is the probability of running for a higher office: vice mayor for
city and village chair for village regressions. The tradition variable is an indicator
for whether the constituency has had a first place councilor win for higher office
in the past. The unit of observation is a candidate. Columns 1-2 use the full
sample with quadratic and cubic control functions. Column 3 uses the Calonico
et al. (2014) selection method while column 4 uses the Imbens and Kalyanaraman
(2012) selection method. Second place mean is the estimated value of the dependent variable for the second placer using the Imbens and Kalyanaraman (2012)
method. ***,** and * denote statistical significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent
levels, respectively.

